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CONGRESS AND COMMERCIAL TRUSTS: DEALING WITH 
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION POST-AMERICOLD
S.I. Strong*
Abstract
Commercial trusts are one of the United States’ most important types 
of business organizations, holding trillions of dollars of assets and 
operating nationally and internationally as a “mirror image” of the 
corporation. However, commercial trusts remain underappreciated and 
undertheorized in comparison to corporations, often as a result of the 
popular but mistaken belief that commercial trusts are analogous to 
traditional intergenerational trusts or that corporations reflect the primary 
or paradigmatic form of business association.
The treatment of commercial trusts reached its nadir in early 2016, 
when the U.S. Supreme Court held in Americold Realty Trust v. ConAgra 
Foods, Inc. that the citizenship of a commercial trust should be equated 
with that of its shareholder-beneficiaries for purposes of diversity 
jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the sheer number of shareholder-
beneficiaries in most commercial trusts (often amounting to hundreds if 
not thousands of individuals) typically precludes the parties’ ability to 
establish complete diversity and thus eliminates the possibility of federal 
jurisdiction over most commercial trust disputes. As a result, virtually all 
commercial trust disputes will now be heard in state court, despite their 
complexity, their impact on matters of national public policy, and their 
effect on the domestic and global economies. 
Americold will also result in differential treatment of commercial 
trusts and corporations for purposes of federal jurisdiction, even though 
courts and commentators have long recognized the functional 
equivalence of the two types of business associations. Furthermore, as 
this research shows, there is no theoretical justification for this type of 
unequal treatment. 
This Article therefore suggests, as a normative proposition, that 
Congress override Americold and provide commercial trusts with access 
to federal courts in a manner similar to that enjoyed by corporations. This 
recommendation is the result of a rigorous interdisciplinary analysis of 
both the jurisprudential and practical problems created by Americold as a
matter of trust law, procedural law, and the law of incorporated and 
unincorporated business associations. This Article identifies two possible 
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Congressional responses to Americold, one involving reliance on 
minimal diversity, as in cases falling under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d) and 
1369, and the other involving a statutory definition of the citizenship of 
commercial trusts similar to that used for corporations under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(c). In so doing, this Article hopes to place commercial trusts and 
corporations on an equal footing and avoid the numerous negative 
externalities generated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Americold. 
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued a number 
of decisions seeking to clarify diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts, 
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particularly with respect to commercial organizations.1 While these cases 
have not achieved the level of notoriety associated with the Court’s recent 
jurisprudence on personal jurisdiction,2 rules on diversity jurisdiction 
have a significant and potentially outcome-determinative effect on 
commercial litigation in the United States.3 When considered on a 
cumulative basis, the Court’s decisions on diversity jurisdiction have a 
meaningful impact on the U.S. economy as a whole.4
Nowhere is this phenomenon more clearly illustrated than in the 
Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Americold Realty Trust v. ConAgra 
Foods, Inc.,5 which considered the citizenship of commercial trusts for 
the purpose of diversity jurisdiction.6 Commercial trusts are an often-
overlooked but extremely important type of business organization that 
                                                                                                                     
1. See, e.g., Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1014 (2016)
(considering citizenship of commercial trusts); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010) 
(describing a corporation’s principle place of business pursuant to the “nerve center” test); 
Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 306 (2006) (determining the citizenship of a federally 
chartered national bank for diversity purposes); Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., 541 U.S. 
567, 568 (2004) (considering whether a post-filing change in citizenship and status of both limited 
and general partners’ citizenship should be considered in determining a partnership’s citizenship 
in a diversity case); Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195 (1990) (reaffirming the rule 
that the citizenship of all members of a partnership must be considered in determining whether
complete diversity exists).
2. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 
746, 751 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 929 (2011); 
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 877 (2011); Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. 
Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. 
Bauman, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 107 (2015); Roger M. Michalski, Rights Come with 
Responsibilities: Personal Jurisdiction in the Age of Corporate Personhood, 50 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 125, 188 (2013); Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the 
Fallacy of Consent, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1413 (2015); Zoe Niesel, Daimler and the 
Jurisdictional Triskelion, 82 TENN. L. REV. 833, 837 (2015); John T. Parry, Rethinking Personal 
Jurisdiction After Bauman and Walden, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 607, 611 (2015); Stephen E. 
Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1301, 1304–05 
(2014); Alan M. Trammell, A Tale of Two Jurisdictions, 68 VAND. L. REV. 501, 502 (2015). 
3. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal 
Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 
607 (1998) (comparing outcomes in state and federal court). But see Debra Lyn Bassett, The 
Hidden Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 119, 140–41 (2003) (challenging 
empirical studies regarding the perceived superiority of federal court); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The 
Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1847–48 (2008) (discussing the role of diversity jurisdiction in case 
outcomes).
4. See Peter B. Oh, A Jurisdictional Approach to Collapsing Corporate Distinctions, 55
RUTGERS L. REV. 389, 451 (2003); William Howard Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in 
Administration of Justice in Federal Courts, 8 A.B.A. J. 601, 604 (1922).
5. Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1017.
6. Id. at 1014.
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operate as a functional equivalent to corporations7 and “dominate certain 
types of modern business and financial transactions.”8 These types of 
trusts bear little resemblance to traditional intergenerational trusts (i.e., 
those meant to pass on personal wealth after death) and play a central role 
in the U.S. economy, holding trillions of dollars’ worth of assets and 
generating billions of dollars’ worth of annual income, with 
administrators and trustees earning similarly massive amounts in fees 
each year.9
Americold held that, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, commercial 
trusts are to be considered citizens of any state where their beneficiaries 
may be found.10 The problem is that commercial trusts can have hundreds 
if not hundreds of thousands of beneficiaries spread throughout the fifty 
United States and indeed throughout the world.11 In many cases, it is not 
possible for commercial trusts to determine the citizenship and domicile 
of their beneficiaries.12 As a result, it will be difficult if not impossible 
for many commercial trusts to establish complete diversity as a matter of 
                                                                                                                     
7. See Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 550 (1928) (stating that the classification of an 
entity is not essential to determine its powers); Paul B. Miller, The Future for Business Trusts: A 
Comparative Analysis of Canadian and American Uniform Legislation, 36 QUEEN’S L.J. 443, 451 
(2011) (explaining that the trust was displaced by the corporation only when incorporation 
become more accessible); Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: 
Unraveling the Mystery, 58 BUS. LAW. 559, 560 (2003); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts as 
“Uncorporation”: A Research Agenda, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 31, 31 (2005). 
8. Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 559; see also John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: 
The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 172 (1997).
9. See David Horton, The Federal Arbitration Act and Testamentary Instruments, 90 N.C.
L. REV. 1027, 1070 (2012); Langbein, supra note 8, at 178 (estimating in 1994 that commercial 
trusts held assets in the range of $11.6 trillion, with non-commercial trusts holding an additional 
$672 billion in assets, conservatively estimated). There does not appear to be any comprehensive 
data on the amount of money currently held by commercial trusts, although Professor Robert 
Sitkoff is in the process of compiling this information. See Robert H. Sitkoff, The American 
Statutory Business Trust: A Research Agenda, in THE REGULATION OF WEALTH MANAGEMENT 17,
29 (Hans Tjio ed., 2008). Some sector-specific information exists. See infra Subsection I.B.2.
10. Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1016.
11. See Ryan A. Christy, Redefining the Juridical Person: Examining the Business Trust 
and Other Unincorporated Associations for Citizenship Purposes, 6 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 137, 151 
(2004). For example, one publicly traded commercial trust that operates nationwide has over 96 
million shares of common stock. See CIM Commercial Trust Announces Preliminary Results of 
Tender Offer, BUS. WIRE (June 14, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/
home/20160614005650/en/CIM-Commercial-Trust-Announces-Preliminary-Results-Tender; see 
also infra Subsection I.B.2.
12. Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1016; see also Thomas E. Rutledge & Christopher E. Schaefer, 
The Trust as an Entity and Diversity Jurisdiction: Is Navarro Applicable to the Modern Business 
Trust?, 48 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 83, 104 (2013) (explaining that trusts used in complex 
financial structures may lack information as to the citizenship of their beneficial owners). 
4
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law.13 Indeed, this phenomenon has already occurred as part of the post-
Americold reality.14
Because most trusts, including commercial trusts, are governed by 
state rather than federal law, these types of disputes will now be heard 
almost exclusively in state court.15 This is an outcome that has been 
considered problematic not only in cases involving corporations16 but 
also in other types of matters involving “national problems that happen 
to be governed by state law.”17 Indeed, numerous authorities—including 
the Supreme Court, the Judicial Conference, and Congress—have 
routinely recognized the significant benefits that are associated with 
federal jurisdiction.18 A special Committee on Jurisdiction and Venue 
convened by the Judicial Conference in 1951 to consider corporate 
citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction specifically noted that 
“to close the doors of the national tribunals to organized business seems 
to the Committee to be a bad policy that would create far more evil than 
it would cure.”19
The situation is exacerbated by the international nature of many 
commercial trusts, since the rule on alienage jurisdiction20 means that 
                                                                                                                     
13. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 
(1806); 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3605 (3d ed. 
2015); Charles J. Cooper & Howard C. Nielson, Jr., Complete Diversity and the Closing of the 
Federal Courts, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 300 (2014) (stating the requirement for 
complete diversity is that the citizenship of every plaintiff be different from every defendant). 
14. See RTP LLC v. ORIX Real Estate Capital, Inc., 827 F.3d 689, 693 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(involving a pension trust); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Transcon. Realty Inv’rs, Inc., No. 3:14-
cv-3565-BN, 2016 WL 3570648, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 1, 2016) (involving a securitization trust).
15. See Thomas E. Rutledge & Ellisa O. Habbart, The Uniform Statutory Trust Entity Act: 
A Review, 65 BUS. LAW. 1055, 1055 (2010).
16. Concerns about state jurisdiction over corporate matters led to the creation of a special 
rule regarding diversity jurisdiction for corporations. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2012); see also 
infra notes 385–402 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(c)).
17. Diane P. Wood, The Changing Face of Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 593, 
605 (2009).
18. See, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 85 (2010) (providing for a court free of 
local prejudice); S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4 (1958), as reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3102; 
see also 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3116–20 (reproducing the 1951 Report of the Committee on 
Jurisdiction and Venue to the Judicial Conference, which identified various problems with state 
courts).
19. 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3119.
20. Although most authorities consider alienage jurisdiction (which involves “citizens of a 
State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state”) as identical to diversity jurisdiction (which 
involves “citizens of different States”), there are some significant differences. U.S. CONST. art. 
III, § 2, cl. 1; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012); Walter C. Hutchens, Alienage Jurisdiction and 
the Problem of Stateless Corporations: What Is a Foreign State for Purposes of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(a)(2)?, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1067, 1072 (1998) (emphasizing that “[n]ot only do diversity 
and alienage jurisdiction apply to different types of parties, they are also founded on different 
5
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U.S. citizens domiciled abroad are considered “foreign aliens” who are 
“stateless” under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).21 As a result, a commercial trust 
will be unable to establish diversity jurisdiction if even one of its 
beneficiaries is a U.S. citizen residing abroad,22 something that is 
becoming increasingly likely in the modern world.23 Indeed, as Professor 
Peter Oh has recognized, the rise of globalization and the concomitant 
increase in the use of commercial trusts has made “the problem of 
statelessness . . . not only real, but potentially ubiquitous.”24
Similar problems occur in cases involving corporations that are 
incorporated outside the United States and have their primary place of 
business in the United States,25 which suggests that commercial trusts 
formed in offshore jurisdictions (again, an increasingly likely 
possibility)26 will experience problems with U.S. federal jurisdiction as 
                                                                                                                     
rationales”); Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations and Modern 
Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction Over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT’L L.
1, 4 (1996) (noting the “academic preoccupation” with diversity jurisdiction and highlighting the 
dearth of attention given to alienage jurisdiction).
21. See Oh, supra note 4, at 466. Professor Peter Oh suggests circumventing this problem 
by “accord[ing] jurisdictional citizenship to foreign aliens based on their domicile.” Id. at 461.
22. See Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12, 14 (1800) (noting that one of the parties 
must be a U.S. citizen in order for federal courts to have diversity jurisdiction); Gall v. Topcall 
Int’l, No. Civ. A. 04-CV-432, 2005 WL 664502, at *4–5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2005) (discussing the 
historical interpretation of alienage jurisdiction); 4 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3604 
(discussing diversity jurisdiction in suits with citizens or subjects of foreign states as parties). 
23. See Joe Costanzo & Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels, Counting the Uncountable: 
Overseas Americans, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (May 17, 2013), 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/counting-uncountable-overseas-americans (noting the 
difficulty in estimating American expatriates and placing the number between 2.2 million and 6.8 
million); Lyman Stone, In an Age of Global Citizenship, American Expatriates Increase,
FEDERALIST (May 4, 2015), http://thefederalist.com/2015/05/04/in-an-age-of-global-citizenship-
american-expatriates-increase/ (estimating approximately thirteen million Americans born abroad 
as of 2013, excluding military and diplomatic personnel, long-term tourists and temporary 
workers). 
24. Oh, supra note 4, at 459; see also id. at 450–51 (discussing the interaction between 
alienage jurisdiction and international commercial interests).
25. See Hutchens, supra note 20, at 1073; David A. Greher, Note, The Application of 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) to Alien Corporations: A Dual Citizenship Analysis, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 233, 
233–34 (1995).
26. While this Article will not discuss commercial trusts outside the United States in detail, 
they are growing in importance. See Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: 
A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 466–69 (1998); Norman 
P. Ho, A Tale of Two Cities: Business Trust Listings and Capital Markets in Singapore and Hong 
Kong, 11 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 311, 314 (2012) (noting rise of business trusts in Japan, Korea, 
Singapore, and Hong Kong as well as in continental Europe); Miller, supra note 7, at 444 
(comparing commercial trusts in the U.S. and Canada); Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts 
as Business Organizations: An Invitation to Comparatists, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 321, 322 
(2003); Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 47–48.
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well. As a result, commercial trusts are caught between a rock (in some 
cases, the Rock of Gibraltar) and a hard place.
Matters relating to the citizenship of a commercial trust are not merely 
academic. Instead, the question of where a business entity can expect to 
sue or be sued is often critical to its operational decisions.27 Indeed, in its 
“Doing Business” guides to international commerce, the World Bank 
always “measures the presence of rules that . . . minimize the cost of 
resolving disputes, increase the predictability of economic interactions 
and provide contractual partners with core protections against abuse,”
three criteria that are often associated with distinctions between U.S. state 
and federal courts.28 Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision in Americold is 
relevant not only to commercial actors in the United States but also to 
foreign parties considering whether to do business with and in the United 
States.29
Although Americold is consistent with the Court’s recent efforts to 
limit federal subject matter jurisdiction,30 the decision is at odds with 
Congress’s longstanding desire to protect diversity jurisdiction in cases 
involving complex multijurisdictional disputes that are prone to error and 
bias if heard in state court.31 This policy is particularly well-established 
in matters involving corporations.32 Given the intricate, (inter)national 
nature of contemporary commercial trust disputes as well as the extensive 
similarities between commercial trusts and corporations, it appears 
appropriate if not necessary for Congress to override the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Americold so as to avoid injury to individual and institutional 
interests as well as to the U.S. economy as a whole.33 This Article 
                                                                                                                     
27. See Oh, supra note 4, at 465. 
28. WORLD BANK, ABOUT DOING BUSINESS 19 (2016), https://web.archive.org/web/
20160430093742/http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Docume
nts/Annual-Reports/English/DB16-Chapters/DB16-About-Doing-Business.pdf; see also infra 
Section III.A (regarding the theoretical justifications for diversity jurisdiction).
29. See Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1016 (2016). 
Foreign entities or U.S. entities operating abroad are subject to relatively complex and often 
counterintuitive rules on citizenship. See Geraldine Soat Brown, When Is a Foreigner Diverse? 
Diversity Jurisdiction in Cases Involving Foreign Citizens and Businesses, 62 FED. LAW.,
Jan./Feb. 2015, at 66, 66–70.
30. See Cooper & Nielson, supra note 13, at 300–04 (discussing various ways that federal 
courts interpret and apply rules regarding complete diversity so as to restrict access to federal 
courts). 
31. See 13E WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3605; see infra notes 363–91 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Interpleader Act; the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction 
Act (also known as the mass-disaster act); and the Class Action Fairness Act). 
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012).
33. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1016.
7
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therefore recommends legislative action, consistent with the Court’s
invitation to Congress in Americold.34
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the problem by 
outlining the Supreme Court’s decision in Americold and providing a 
brief introduction to commercial trusts, including the differences between 
commercial and non-commercial trusts as well as the various types of 
commercial trusts. This discussion demonstrates the widespread negative 
effect that Americold will have on individuals and institutions as well as 
the U.S. economy as a whole.
Part II compares commercial trusts and corporations on both a 
practical and theoretical level and considers whether and to what extent 
the two types of business organizations can and should be considered 
analogous for purposes of federal jurisdiction. The procedural analysis 
becomes more targeted in Part III, which focuses specifically on diversity 
jurisdiction and commercial trusts. After describing why commercial 
trusts meet the theoretical rationales for diversity jurisdiction, the 
discussion identifies a number of practical concerns arising out of the rule 
in Americold, focusing in particular on commercial actors’ anticipated 
efforts to exit the existing dispute resolution regime through arbitration, 
forum selection clauses, choice of law provisions, place of organization 
and choice of business form. Each of these alternatives carries a number 
of risks and negative externalities that Congress may wish to avoid.
Next, Part IV provides a detailed analysis of two possible 
Congressional responses to Americold. One option involves enacting 
legislation that would extend the rule on corporate citizenship to 
commercial trusts.35 In many ways, this appears to be the preferred 
solution, since it respects the functional and theoretical similarities 
between corporations and commercial trusts and offers the lower courts 
a simple and thus predictable rule to follow.36 Another option involves an 
exception to the rule requiring complete diversity, similar to that 
established by Congress in other contexts.37 Although this approach 
might require more detailed legislative drafting, it might reflect the 
                                                                                                                     
34. See id. at 1017. Empirical studies suggest that Congress is highly likely to act if the 
Supreme Court makes such an invitation. See Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011,
92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1332 fig.1 (2014).
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). 
36. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010) (noting that “[s]imple jurisdictional 
rules . . . promote greater predictability”); Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 550 (1928) (noting 
functional equivalence of two business forms); Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 560; Sitkoff, supra note 
7, at 31.
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); see also infra notes 363–91 (discussing complete diversity 
and the Interpleader Act; the Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act; and the Class Action 
Fairness Act).
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preferred policy objective (i.e., minimal diversity rather than complete 
diversity based on the statutory citizenship of a commercial trust).38 After 
considering these proposals, the Conclusion ties together the various 
strands of argument to conclude the Article. 
Before beginning, it is important to note that this Article focuses 
exclusively on commercial trusts, which were the type of entity at issue 
in Americold.39 Although some or all of the arguments contained herein 
may be equally applicable to other types of business organizations (such 
as partnerships, limited liability companies, benefit corporations and the 
like), those entities are subject to their own unique jurisprudence and are 
therefore beyond the scope of the current discussion.40 However, the 
widespread support for legislative reform regarding jurisdictional 
treatment of other types of unincorporated business organizations, 
including a recent resolution from the American Bar Association in that 
regard, suggests that the proposals contained herein are both timely and 
well within the mainstream of American jurisprudence.41
It should also be noted that some courts have criticized Congress’s
failure to address problems relating to the citizenship of unincorporated 
                                                                                                                     
38. See infra Part IV (discussing possible statutory approach).
39. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1014.
40. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 85; see also Michael E. Chaplin, 
Resolving the Principal Place of Business Conundrum: Adopting a Single Test for Federal 
Diversity Jurisdiction, 30 REV. LITIG. 75, 98–99 (2010) (discussing questions of corporate 
citizenship after Hertz); Debra R. Cohen, Limited Liability Company Citizenship: Reconsidering 
an Illogical and Inconsistent Choice, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 269, 272–73 (2006) (arguing that limited 
liability companies should follow the statutory rule of “entity citizenship” similar to corporations, 
which can be at most a citizen of two states (the state of creation and its principal place of business) 
rather than the common law rule of “aggregate citizenship,” which looks through the 
organizational form to its individual owners, as in cases involving partnerships); Daniel S. 
Kleinberger, The Closely Held Business Through the Entity-Aggregate Prism, 40 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 827, 829–30 (2005); John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, A Call for a Unified Business 
Organization Law, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1996). “Benefit corporations” are a new type 
of business organization that may or may not fall within the statutory exception to complete 
diversity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A
Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 592 (2011) (describing benefit 
corporations as a “hybrid organizational form”). Compare Hoagland v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von 
Gontard, P.C., 385 F.3d 737, 740–44 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing diversity jurisdiction in cases 
involving non-business corporations and applying the statutory rule), with Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors 
v. Nat’l Real Estate Ass’n, Inc., 894 F.2d 937, 940 (7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the statutory rule on 
diversity and looking to the shareholders as real parties in interest in a case involving a non-profit 
corporation). For example, some benefit corporations may be public in nature, thereby calling into 
question whether they can be considered a “citizen” of a state or a state entity. See Mich. Dep’t of 
Transp. v. Allstate Painting & Contracting Co., No. 2:08-cv-286, 2009 WL 891702, at *2 (W.D. 
Mich. Mar. 31, 2009). 
41. See House of Delegates Resolutions: 103B, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/news/
reporter_resources/annual-meeting-2015/house-of-delegates-resolutions/103b.html (last visited 
June 30, 2017) [hereinafter ABA Resolution 103B].
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entities and have called for the Supreme Court to craft some sort of 
judicial response.42 While such an effort might have been desirable, it 
does not appear to be forthcoming in light of the Court’s decision in 
Americold.43 As a result, this Article focuses exclusively on statutory 
solutions.
I. THE PROBLEM
If Congress is to appreciate the scope of the problem created by 
Americold, it must understand both the decision itself as well as the nature 
and economic importance of commercial trusts. Both of these issues are 
addressed in the following Subsections.
A. Americold Realty Trust v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.
The analysis begins with the Supreme Court’s decision in Americold.
The case involved a contract dispute between a number of corporations 
whose goods were destroyed in a warehouse fire.44 The warehouse in 
question was owned by Americold Realty Trust, a real estate investment 
trust (REIT) formed under Maryland law, and the district court heard the 
dispute pursuant to its jurisdiction under the diversity statute.45 However, 
when the matter came up for appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit raised the question of federal subject matter jurisdiction sua 
sponte and held that jurisdiction did not exist under the diversity statute.46
In so doing, the Tenth Circuit held that “the citizenship of any ‘non-
corporate artificial entity’ is determined by considering all of the entity’s
‘members,’ which include, at minimum, its shareholders.”47 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split regarding the 
citizenship of commercial trusts and affirmed the Tenth Circuit opinion.48
When considering this matter, the Supreme Court began by discussing 
the long and somewhat troubled history of citizenship for legal persons.49
                                                                                                                     
42. See Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 111 (3d Cir. 2015) (Ambro, 
C.J., concurring) (“As Congress has not accepted the invitation of the Court to craft a workable 
law of business citizenship, the latter should step into the breach.”).
43. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1016.
44. Id. at 1014.
45. See id. at 1014; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1), 1441(b).
46. Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1014. 
47. Id. at 1015 (quoting ConAgra Foods, Inc. v. Americold Logistics, LLC, 776 F.3d 1175, 
1180–81 (10th Cir. 2015)).
48. See id.
49. See id. Commentators have argued that the lines between corporate and natural 
personhood are becoming inappropriately blurred. See Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of Corporate 
Groups: Corporate Identity Reconceived, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 879, 891–97 (2012) 
(discussing theories of corporate personhood); Michalski, supra note 2, at 126–27 (discussing 
corporate personhood in the context of jurisdictional concerns); S.I. Strong, Religious Rights in 
10
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For example, the Court made an exception for corporations as early as 
1844, deeming them to be citizens of the state in which they were 
incorporated.50 That rule was subsequently codified by Congress in 
1958.51 However, other artificial entities have continued to be considered 
citizens of the state(s) of the entity’s individual members, despite 
opposition from courts, commentators, and practitioners.52
The question to be resolved in Americold involved the definition of 
the term “members” in the context of a commercial trust.53 To answer this 
question, the Supreme Court looked to the law of the state under which 
the trust was organized, a technique that has been criticized in other 
contexts on the grounds that “state law should not delineate the limits of 
federal jurisdictional reach.”54
According to Maryland law, REITs such as the one at issue in 
Americold involve property that is held and managed “for the benefit and 
profit of any person who may become a shareholder.”55 As a result, the 
Supreme Court held that Americold’s members were comprised of its 
various shareholders.56
Americold had argued a different proposition, claiming that its 
citizenship should have been determined pursuant to the Supreme Court’s
rule in Navarro Savings Assn. v. Lee,57 which was said to suggest that 
“anything called a ‘trust’ possesses the citizenship of its trustees alone, 
not its shareholder beneficiaries as well.”58 However, the Court rejected 
                                                                                                                     
Historical, Theoretical, and International Context: Hobby Lobby as a Jurisprudential Anomaly?,
48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 813, 820 (2015) (discussing corporate personhood in the context of 
religious liberties); see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11022 (West 2016) (defining a 
“person” as including a business trust). The issue continues to vex the Court. See Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014) (providing corporations with religious 
rights); Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1705 (2012) (holding only natural persons 
can be liable under the Torture Victim Protection Act).
50. See Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558 
(1844), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
51. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
52. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1015; Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 
99, 111 (3d Cir. 2015) (Ambro, C.J., concurring); Chaplin, supra note 40, at 98–99; Cohen, supra 
note 40, at 272; Kleinberger, supra note 40, at 830; Matheson & Olson, supra note 40, at 1. 
53. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1015. 
54. Recent Case, Diversity Jurisdiction—Definition of a Corporation Under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(c), 118 HARV. L. REV. 1347, 1347 (2005) (discussing Hoagland v. Sandberg, Phoenix & 
von Gontard, P.C., 385 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1015–16.
55. Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1016 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 8-101(c), 
8-102 (West 2016)).
56. See id. at 1016. Americold did not provide information on the citizenship of its 
members, so it was impossible for the Supreme Court or any of the lower courts to determine 
whether complete diversity existed. Id. at 1015–16.
57. 446 U.S. 458 (1980). 
58. Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1016.
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Americold’s argument on the grounds that Navarro involved situations 
where a trustee brought suit in his, her, or its individual capacity rather 
than matters where the trust itself was a party.59
The Court also discussed the correlation between “traditional” trusts 
(i.e., those designed primarily for the intergenerational transfer of 
personal wealth) and commercial trusts such as the REIT at issue in 
Americold.60 Americold had argued that the longstanding jurisdictional 
rule applicable to trusts (i.e., that the citizenship of the trust can and 
should be equated with the citizenship of the trustee, not the beneficiaries) 
should apply even to commercial trusts.61 However, the Court believed 
that, at their core, traditional trusts constituted little more than a fiduciary 
relationship that could not be made an independent party to a lawsuit, 
which justified a rule deeming the citizenship of the trust to be the same 
as the citizenship of the trustee.62 However, the Court found that “[m]any 
States . . . have applied the ‘trust’ label to a variety of unincorporated 
entities that have little in common with this traditional template.”63 The 
various discrepancies between commercial and non-commercial trusts64
led the Court to adopt a bright line rule holding that “[s]o long as such an 
entity is unincorporated, this Court will apply our ‘oft-repeated rule’ that 
it possesses the citizenship of all its members.”65
Although the Court’s decision in Americold was unanimous, there are 
signs that the Justices believed the holding was incorrect as a matter of 
policy, even if the outcome was appropriate as a matter of law, and that 
the Justices would therefore support a Congressional override.66 For 
example, the Court specifically cited an earlier decision, Carden v. 
Arkoma Associates,67 which recognized that a similar rule from 1990 
involving the citizenship of partnerships could “validly be characterized 
as technical, precedent-bound, and unresponsive to policy considerations 
raised by the changing realities of business organization.”68 The Court in 
Americold then stated that “[t]hen as now we reaffirm that it is up to 
                                                                                                                     
59. Id. In traditional trusts, a trust cannot sue or be sued in its own name; instead, suit must 
be brought by or against the trustees. See Rutledge & Schaefer, supra note 12, at 90–91.
60. Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1016. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. The differences are indeed significant. See infra Subsection I.B.1.
65. Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1016 (quoting Carden v. Arkoma Assoc., 494 U.S. 185, 195 
(1990)).
66. See id. at 1017. 
67. 494 U.S. 185 (1990). 
68. Id. at 196; Cooper & Nielson, supra note 13, at 303 (discussing rules regarding limited 
partnerships and limited liability corporations).
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Congress if it wishes to incorporate other entities into 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(c)’s special jurisdictional rule.”69
Congress is not insensitive to the need for statutory overrides of 
Supreme Court decisions and has enacted such legislation on a variety of 
occasions.70 This Article therefore recommends that Congress adopt 
provisions to allow commercial trust disputes to be heard in federal court, 
either by treating commercial trusts the same as corporations when it 
comes to matters relating to citizenship or by eliminating the need for 
complete diversity.71
B. Commercial Trusts
If Congress is to appreciate the need for action, it must understand the 
nature and scope of commercial trusts. In some ways, this may be a 
difficult task, since commentators universally agree that commercial 
trusts “are a woefully under-analyzed and underappreciated form of 
business organization,” even though these devices are “critically 
important” to the national and international corporate communities.72
To some extent, it is unclear why commercial trusts have been ignored 
in this manner. One reason may be that the complexity and diversity of 
contemporary commercial trusts makes any sort of generalized analysis 
difficult, if not impossible.73 Some scholars may be put off by the 
challenges associated with researching commercial trusts74 or by the fact 
that trusts are governed almost entirely by state rather than federal law.75
However, the most logical explanation derives from commercial trusts’
interstitial nature.76 Although the vast majority of assets held in trust 
today are in commercial rather than traditional trusts, most specialists in 
trust law focus on trusts created for estate planning purposes.77
                                                                                                                     
69. Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1017.
70. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 34, at 1409–13 (discussing various overrides). 
But see Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and Litigation Reform: 
An Institutional Approach, 15 NEV. L.J. 1559, 1594 (2015) (suggesting Congress is less likely to 
override the Supreme Court in certain types of cases).
71. See infra Part IV.
72. Miller, supra note 7, at 444.
73. See infra Subsection I.B.2 (discussing the types and nature of commercial trusts).
74. See Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 39 (remarking on the “puzzling experience” of finding only 
a single reported decision under the Delaware business trust statute, despite the fact that trillions 
of dollars are held in statutory commercial trusts).
75. See Rutledge & Habbart, supra note 15, at 1055. 
76. See Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 34.
77. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 8, at 166. This phenomenon is true both in academia and 
in practice. See S.I. Strong, Global Developments in Trust Arbitration, in ARBITRATION OF TRUST 
DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 4 n.4 (S.I. Strong ed., 2016) (noting 
large law firms house trust specialists in their estates practice, although commercial trusts 
generally fall within the domain of the corporate department). 
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Unfortunately, the lacuna is not filled by the commercial law community, 
since practitioners and scholars in that field concentrate largely on 
corporations and unincorporated business forms such as limited liability 
companies (LLCs) and partnerships.78 As a result, it is necessary to 
provide a brief primer on commercial trusts to provide the foundation for 
the arguments made elsewhere in this Article.79
1. Commercial Versus Non-Commercial Trusts
Although the Supreme Court downplayed the similarities between 
commercial trusts and traditional trusts in Americold, the two 
mechanisms do resemble one another in some regards.80 For example, 
commercial and non-commercial trusts both separate legal and beneficial 
ownership of a particular asset,81 with the trustee holding legal title to the 
                                                                                                                     
78. See Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 33 (noting “domestic business law scholars have a stunning 
lack of familiarity with the business trust”). Many practitioners are similarly uninformed. See 
Rutledge & Habbart, supra note 15, at 1059.
79. This summary is necessary because many lawyers’ only reference for trusts is in law 
school classes on estate planning. See S.I. Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes: Two Bodies of 
Law Collide, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1157, 1168–69 (2012).
80. Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1016 (2016). 
81. See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 
625, 632–43, 669–71 (1995); see also DAVID HAYTON ET AL., UNDERHILL AND HAYTON: LAW 
RELATING TO TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES ¶ 1.95 (David Hayton ed., 18th ed. 2010); WILLIAM M.
MCGOVERN ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES: INCLUDING TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS
369 (4th ed. 2010) (“The word ‘trust’ is used for many property arrangements that have little in 
common with each other apart from the fact that they were historically enforced . . . in the Court 
of Equity . . . .”). One internationally recognized set of criteria states that
the term “trust” refers to the legal relationships created—inter vivos or on 
death—by a person, the settlor, when assets have been placed under the control 
of a trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary or for a specified purpose. 
A trust has the following characteristics—
a) the assets constitute a separate fund and are not a part of the trustee’s 
own estate; 
b) title to the trust assets stands in the name of the trustee or in the name 
of another person on behalf of the trustee; 
c) the trustee has the power and the duty, in respect of which he is 
accountable, to manage, employ or dispose of the assets in accordance 
with the terms of the trust and the special duties imposed upon him by 
law. 
The reservation by the settlor of certain rights and powers, and the fact that the 
trustee may himself have rights as a beneficiary, are not necessarily inconsistent 
with the existence of a trust.
14
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property for the benefit of the beneficiary, who holds equitable title to the 
property.82 The person who creates and funds the trust is known as the 
settlor.83 Both commercial and non-commercial trusts contemplate the 
possibility that there may be more than one person in each role (for 
example, there may be multiple settlors, multiple trustees, or multiple 
beneficiaries).84 Furthermore, the same person may act in multiple roles 
(for example, a settlor may also be a trustee, and a trustee may also be a 
beneficiary) so long as there is not an identity between a single trustee 
and a single beneficiary.85
Commercial and non-commercial trusts both give rise to two different 
types of disputes: (1) external (third-party) disputes that involve 
relationships with non-parties to the trust and (2) internal disputes that 
address matters relating to the inner workings of the trust and involving 
conflicts between some or all of the various parties to the trust.86 Of the 
two types, internal disputes are by far the more common.87 Unfortunately, 
these are precisely the types of disputes that are most at risk of falling 
under the rule in Americold and thus being barred from federal court.88
Furthermore, reports suggest that hostile trust litigation is reaching “near 
epidemic” levels, meaning that the judiciary can expect to see more of 
these types of disputes in the coming years.89
                                                                                                                     
Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition art. 2, July 1, 1985, 23 
I.L.M. 1389 (1984) [hereinafter Hague Convention on Trusts]. 
82. See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 81, at 370; Langbein, supra note 81, at 632. But see 
Rutledge & Schaefer, supra note 12, at 102 (noting some types of commercial trusts vest the title 
to trust property in the trust as a legal entity). The various roles may be altered somewhat in some 
statutory business trusts.
83. See Hague Convention on Trusts, supra note 81, art. 2; MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 
81, at 370. 
84. See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 81, at 374–81. 
85. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 69 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2001) (discussing 
merger).
86. See HAYTON ET AL., supra note 81, ¶¶ 8.157–.167; Langbein, supra note 81, at 664. 
Different commentators define internal and external trust disputes differently. See Paul Buckle & 
Carey Olsen, Trust Disputes and ADR, 14 TR. & TRUSTEES 649, 651 (2008); Tina Wüstemann, 
Arbitration of Trust Disputes, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 2007, at 33, 38 (Christoph Müller ed., 2007).
87. See Michael Hwang, Arbitration for Trust Disputes, in GUIDE TO THE WORLD’S
LEADING EXPERTS IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 83, 83 (2009).
88. Internal disputes typically proceed in rem and therefore require participation of all 
beneficiaries, which can number in the hundreds of thousands. See infra Subsection I.B.2.
External disputes would likely fall under the rule in Navarro, although the future applicability of 
that case to commercial trusts is somewhat in doubt. See Navarro Sav. Ass’n. v. Lee, 446 U.S. 
458, 465–66 (1980); see also supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
89. Lawrence Cohen & Marcus Staff, The Arbitration of Trust Disputes, 7 J. INT’L TR. &
CORP. PLAN. 203, 203 (1999).
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Commentators sometimes seek to distinguish commercial and non-
commercial trusts on the grounds that many commercial trusts are 
statutory in nature.90 However, that issue is not as important as it may 
initially appear, since many commercial trusts, including the well-known 
Massachusetts business trust, are created by private agreements in the 
form of trust deeds or declarations of trust rather than by compliance with 
statutory or regulatory formalities.91 As a result, many of the key legal 
principles relating to commercial trusts are found in the common law 
rather than in statutes.92 This phenomenon has led Professor Robert 
Sitkoff to suggest that there are significant differences between so-called 
“common-law business trusts” and “statutory business trusts.”93
Most issues involving the administration of commercial trusts are 
decided under the same principles that apply to non-commercial trusts.94
Commercial and non-commercial trusts are also both governed primarily 
by state rather than federal law,95 with relatively little harmonization 
                                                                                                                     
90. Twenty-two states have enacted statutes dealing with business trusts. See ALA. CODE
§§ 19-3-60 to -66 (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1871 to -1879 (2016); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 12, §§ 3801–3826 (2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.01–.08 (West 2016); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 23-5-1-1 to -11 (West 2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-2027 to -2038 (West 2016); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 386.370–.440 (West 2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 182, §§ 1–14 (West 2016); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 318.01–.06 (West 2016); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-5-101 to -205 (West 
2016); N.Y. GEN. ASS’NS LAW §§ 1–19-a (McKinney 2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-44 to -
47 (West 2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1746.01–.99 (West 2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, 
§§ 171–174 (2016); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 128.560–.600 (West 2016); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-
53-10 to -50 (2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 47-14A-1 to -96 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-
101-201 to -207 (West 2016); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 6133–6138 (West 2015); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 23.90.010–.060 (West 2016); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 47-9A-1 to -7 (West 
2016); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 226.14 (West 2016); see also MYRON KOVE ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS 
AND TRUSTEES § 247 (2016); Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 35–36 (noting some difficulties in estimating 
the proper number of statutes on business trusts and placing the number in 2005 between 
seventeen and thirty-four). 
91. See 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 1:15 (database updated Dec. 2016); Rutledge & Habbart, supra note 15, at 1055.
92. See Rutledge & Habbart, supra note 15, at 1059; Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 38.
93. Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 32–33.
94. See KOVE ET AL., supra note 90, § 247; Rutledge & Habbart, supra note 15, at 1066. 
Some states, such as Arizona, provide that business trusts are construed pursuant to principles of 
corporation law. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1879 (2016).
95. See Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 42 (questioning whether state law is the dominant factor in 
commercial trust law). Federal law primarily comes into play in the area of tax laws, blue sky 
laws, and the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A)(v) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 301-7701-
4(a) (2016); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (reflecting the “check-the-box regulation” that 
allows commercial trusts to choose whether to be taxed as a corporation or a partnership for 
purposes of the federal tax purposes); KOVE ET AL., supra note 90, §§ 247, 270.40. Federal law 
also requires employee pension funds to adopt the trust form. See Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 34. 
Constitutional issues occasionally come into play. See Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 550 
(1928) (upholding the constitutionality of state legislation requiring foreign commercial trusts to 
16
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across state lines.96
As important as these similarities are, there are numerous ways that 
commercial trusts differ from traditional trusts. Perhaps the most 
important difference involves the purpose of the trust. Although 
commercial trusts operate under a variety of names (such as business 
trusts, Massachusetts trusts, or statutory trusts, depending on the 
context),97 all typically “implement[] bargained-for exchange, in contrast 
to a donative transfer,” which is the primary motivation for trusts created 
to pass on personal or family wealth.98 Thus, “the settlor in a gratuitous 
[non-commercial] trust receives no compensation for the conveyance 
whereas the settlor in a commercial trust—typically a corporation or 
financial institution—always receives payment for the assets conveyed to 
the trust.”99 Furthermore, “[i]n ordinary trusts the settlor is seldom also 
the sole or principal beneficiary; in business trusts the trust res consists 
of property originally contributed by the beneficiaries themselves.”100
Together, these factors demonstrate that commercial trusts are created 
for business rather than donative purposes.101 However, the business 
activities associated with a commercial trust do not need to be either 
active or extensive in nature.102 Furthermore, commercial trusts do not 
necessarily have to include the word “trust” in their name and may instead 
                                                                                                                     
“qualify” before doing business in a particular state and distinguishing commercial trusts from 
traditional trusts to the extent that commercial trusts are “clothed with the ordinary functions and 
attributes of a corporation”).
96. See KOVE ET AL., supra note 90, § 247 (referring to statutory investment trusts and 
subdivision and land trusts); Rutledge & Habbart, supra note 15, at 1055; see also Robert J. 
D’Agostino, The Business Trust and Bankruptcy Remoteness, 2011 NORTON ANN. SURV. BANKR.
L. 4. The Uniform Law Commission has made some attempts to harmonize the law in this area. 
See Acts: Statutory Trust Entity Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Statutory%20Trust%20Entity%20Act (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2017) [hereinafter USTEA]. However, the USTEA has only been adopted in two 
jurisdictions (Kentucky and the District of Columbia). See id.
97. See 1 COX & HAZEN, supra note 91, § 1:15.
98. Langbein, supra note 8, at 166–67. For examples of how commercial trusts operate, see 
Mark Kantor, The Use of Trusts in Financing Transactions: Special Issues Relating to Arbitration 
of Commercial Trusts, in ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 77, at 15, 16–25 (discussing trusts in the context of bond 
indentures, securitizations, lease financings and mutual funds); Schwarcz, supra note 26, at 326.
99. Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 562 (footnote omitted). 
100. KOVE ET AL., supra note 90, § 247.
101. See id.; Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 38–39. For this reason, some authorities exclude 
commercial trusts from their analyses. For example, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts excludes 
business trusts from consideration and focuses solely on donative trusts. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 1 cmt. b (“Although many rules of trust law also apply to business and 
investment trusts, many of these rules do not . . . . [T]he business trust is a business arrangement 
that can best be dealt with in connection with business associations . . . .”). 
102. KOVE ET AL., supra note 90, § 247.
17
Strong: Congress and Commercial Trusts: Dealing with Diversity Jurisdicti
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
1038 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
use terms (such as “company,” “association,” or “limited”) that could be 
used to describe other types of business organizations.103
This is not to say that non-commercial trusts cannot have certain
business-oriented goals. For example, commercial and non-commercial 
trusts both provide protection from insolvency and some forms of 
taxation while also creating a fiduciary regime that requires the 
application of fiduciary duties such as loyalty and prudence.104
Furthermore, a trust can operate a business without being considered a 
commercial trust.105 This distinction has been recognized by the Internal 
Revenue Service, which differentiates between “ordinary trusts,” which 
have as their purpose the protection and conservation of property for the 
benefit of the beneficiaries pursuant to the standard rules of probate or 
chancery, and trusts that are formed for the purpose of making a profit 
through the use of the combined capital of various investors.106
Although commercial trusts have a business purpose, parties 
frequently adopt the commercial trust form to take advantage of the 
structural flexibility inherent in trusts and create relationships or 
procedures that might be difficult or impossible to achieve if the venture 
were organized as a corporation, particularly with respect to “matters of 
internal governance and . . . the creation of beneficial interests.”107
“Transaction planners designing asset securitization trusts especially 
welcome the freedom to carve beneficial interests without regard to 
traditional classes of corporate shares,” creating a wide range of “so-
called tranches, each embodied in its own class of trust security.”108
Interest in commercial trusts has grown exponentially in recent years due 
to the increased liberalization of laws regarding the use and creation of 
such devices.109
                                                                                                                     
103. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3814(c) (West 2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14A.3-
010(15) (West 2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1214(A) (West 2016); Rutledge & Habbart, supra 
note 15, at 1065. But see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-506(c) (West 2016). This may be one of 
the reasons why researchers have so many difficulties identifying commercial trusts. See supra 
note 90 and accompanying text.
104. See Langbein, supra note 8, at 179–83, 189. 
105. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 91, § 1:15; Rutledge & Habbart, supra note 15, at 1099. 
Some authorities suggest that “[w]here a part or all of the trust property consists of a business but 
no certificates of interest are issued the trust is not technically a business trust.” See KOVE ET AL.,
supra note 90, § 247 n.25; see also id. §§ 571–79.
106. See Treas. Reg. § 301-7701-4(a) (2016).
107. Langbein, supra note 8, at 183. 
108. Id. at 183 n.109 (“A tranche is simply a slice of a deal, a payment stream whose expected 
return increases with its riskiness.”).
109. See USTEA, supra note 96; Gerardo J. Bosques-Hernández, Arbitration Clauses in 
Trusts: The U.S. Developments and a Comparative Perspective, 3 REVISTA PARA EL ANALISIS DEL 
DERECHO (INDRET) 1, 20 (2008); Dante Figueroa, Civil Trusts in Latin America: Is the Lack of 
Trusts an Impediment for Expanding Business Opportunities in Latin America?, 24 ARIZ. J. INT’L
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Commercial and non-commercial trusts reflect other key 
differences.110 For example, some types of commercial trusts vest the title 
to trust property in the trust as a legal entity, rather than in the trustees, as 
is the case with traditional trusts.111 Furthermore, many commercial trusts 
are now able to sue and be sued in their own name.112 However, this latter 
issue can become problematic, since Rule 17(b)(3) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure indicates that the ability of an unincorporated entity to 
sue in its own name is determined pursuant to the law of the state where 
the court is located.113 Since commercial trusts often cannot know in 
advance where they will be sued, they cannot anticipate whether and to 
what extent they will be able to sue or be sued in their own name.114 This 
approach differs from Rule 17(b)(2) relating to corporations, which 
indicates that the ability to sue or be sued is determined by the law of the 
state of incorporation.115 Of course, if the rule in Americold is allowed to 
stand, many commercial trusts will not be able to sue or be sued in federal 
court, which eliminates concerns about Rule 17(b)(3).116
Other differences exist between commercial and non-commercial 
trusts. For example, commercial trusts typically refer to beneficiaries as 
“shareholders” or “members” and allow for the free transfer of beneficial 
interests in the trust, often through the issuance of certificates.117
Commercial trusts also give beneficiaries the ability to elect, remove, or 
control the various trustees and amend the terms of the trust, something 
that is difficult or impossible with traditional trusts, at least without settlor 
consent.118 Differences also exist with respect to the residual interest in 
                                                                                                                     
& COMP. L. 701, 721–39 (2007); Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional 
Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J.
356, 359–64 (2005). 
110. See Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 37–38 (noting the potential “mismatch between traditional 
trust law . . . and the exigencies of enterprise organization”).
111. See Rutledge & Schaefer, supra note 12, at 103.
112. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b)(3).
113. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b)(3); see also Recent Case, supra note 54, at 1347 (discussing 
Hoagland v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gotard, P.C., 385 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2004), and arguing 
that “state law should not delineate the limits of federal jurisdictional reach”).
114. Commercial trusts could attempt to override this policy through a choice of law or 
choice of forum provision, but such clauses would likely be unable to cover all issues and all 
potential parties. See infra Subsection III.B.2 and accompanying text.
115. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b)(2).
116. See Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1017 (2016); FED.
R. CIV. P. 17(b)(3).
117. See Jonathan J. Ossip, Note, Diversity Jurisdiction and Trusts, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2301, 
2333–34 (2014).
118. See Thales Alenia Space France v. Thermo Funding Co., 989 F. Supp. 2d 287, 296 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013); Ossip, supra note 117, at 2334.
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the corpus of the trust.119 For example, a settlor in a commercial trust 
“almost always retains a residual interest in trust assets that remain once 
the business transaction is concluded” while a settlor in a traditional trust 
may or may not do so.120 Commercial trusts may also feature centralized 
management, perpetual existence, and state registration requirements that 
are not seen with traditional trusts.121
2. Types of Commercial Trusts
If Congress is to appreciate the scope of the problem created by 
Americold, then it must understand the role that commercial trusts play 
in the economic life of the nation.122 Commercial trusts currently reflect 
a significant proportion of the trusts currently in operation in the United 
States. Indeed, “well over 90% of the money held in trust in the United 
States” in recent years has been held “in commercial trusts as opposed to 
personal trusts.”123 As a result, numerous commentators have concluded 
that “the role of trusts in intrafamily wealth transfers is today ‘relatively 
trivial,’” particularly when compared to the “enormously important” role 
of trusts in the business context.124
While the following discussion does not attempt to provide a 
comprehensive list of all commercial trusts now in existence, it 
nevertheless illustrates how pervasive these instruments now are in the 
U.S. and global economies.125 Furthermore, new forms of commercial 
                                                                                                                     
119. See infra notes 166–67 and accompanying text (regarding differences between 
corporations and commercial trusts with respect to residual interests).
120. Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 562.
121. See Thales, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 296.
122. Some commentators distinguish between statutory trusts and commercial trusts, but that 
level of detail does not appear necessary here. See Rutledge & Schaefer, supra note 12, at 93–94
(discussing the USTEA); see also Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 564–72 (discussing and 
distinguishing various types of commercial trusts, including trusts used as special purpose 
vehicles (SPVs), trusts used for diversifying lending risk, master trusts, business trusts, trust 
indentures, deeds of trust, mutual funds, and REITs).
123. Langbein, supra note 8, at 166–67, 178 (citing figures from mid- to late-1990s).
Commercial trusts have also become increasingly popular outside the United States. See id. at 
166; see also HAYTON ET AL., supra note 81, ¶¶ 1.97–1.138; Figueroa, supra note 109, at 740–51; 
Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 26, at 434–35.
124. Henry Christensen III, Foreign Trusts and Alternative Vehicles, ALI CLE EST. PLAN.
COURSE MATERIALS J., Dec. 2014, at 29, 30.
125. See KOVE ET AL., supra note 90, § 247 (describing some types and uses of commercial 
trusts). For a list of the various types of trusts recognized by the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, see 
Christensen, supra note 124, at 31 (listing nineteen separate categories of trusts). For a brief 
history of the development of the commercial trust from the nineteenth century to the present, see 
Peter B. Oh, Business Trusts, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND 
ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 268, 269–73 (Robert W. Hillman & Mark J. 
Lowenstein eds., 2015); Rutledge & Schaefer, supra note 12, at 86–92.
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trusts are being developed all the time.126
Some commentators, most notably Professor Steven Schwarcz, have 
attempted to provide a taxonomy of commercial trusts that relies on two 
different attributes: “the ‘type’ of trust,” which focuses on particular 
labels given to the trust in question, and “the business use to which the 
trust has been placed.”127 Both methods “are needed because there is 
sometimes an imprecise correlation between labels and functions: certain 
entities called trusts are not trusts, and other entities may be trusts even 
though they do not go by that name.”128
The first and perhaps most important type of commercial trust is the 
pension trust, which arises out of contracts of employment and provides 
employees with the ability to defer some of their compensation until 
retirement.129 Although pension trusts include a private contribution 
element, the trusts themselves are often statutory in nature pursuant to the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),130 which 
indicates that “all assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in 
trust.”131
The amount of pension assets under management in the United States 
was over $24 trillion in 2014,132 with similarly significant amounts held 
                                                                                                                     
126. For example, New Zealand has recently developed the “trading trust,” which is 
distinguishable from unit or investment trusts. See L. COMMISSION (N.Z.), COURT JURISDICTION,
TRADING TRUSTS AND OTHER ISSUES: REVIEW OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS: REVIEW OF THE LAW OF 
TRUSTS FIFTH ISSUES PAPER 66–67 (2011), http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/project/review-law-
trusts?quicktabs_23=issues_paper.
127. Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 563–64. 
128. Id. at 564.
129. See HAYTON ET AL., supra note 81, ¶ 1.127; Langbein, supra note 8, at 168–69.
130. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 
29 U.S.C.).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2012). The United Kingdom recognizes a related type of statutory 
trust known as the employee trust, which is not tied to retirement but which instead provides 
certain tax-related and other benefits to current employees. See Pensions Act 1995, c. 26,
§ 124(1)–(2) (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1995/26/contents/enacted. To the extent 
a pension trust dispute is governed by federal law, it would not have to rely on diversity 
jurisdiction to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction and would thus be exempt from 
concerns arising out of Americold. See Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 
1012, 1014 (2016). But see RTP LLC v. ORIX Real Estate Capital, Inc., 827 F.3d 689, 691–92
(7th Cir. 2016) (applying Americold in a dispute involving a pension trust).
132. See ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PENSION MARKETS IN FOCUS 7
(2015), http://www.oecd.org/finance/private-pensions/globalpensionstatistics.htm [hereinafter 
OECD, PENSION MARKETS]; see also id. at 7, 16 (noting diverse make-up of pension funds); 
Langbein, supra note 8, at 168–69 (noting in 1997 that private pension plans held assets in the 
realm of $3 trillion, with state and federal plans for governmental employees holding an additional
$1.6 trillion in assets, primarily in trust form). While recent market vicissitudes have changed the 
amount held in private and public pension plans since the late 1990s, the amount in question is 
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in trust in other countries.133 Although these numbers are impressive on 
their own, their importance becomes even clearer when one considers that 
in 2015 the market value of the publicly listed U.S. domestic stock market 
was approximately $25.067 trillion.134 Pension trusts can have thousands 
of participants, as illustrated by the Steelworkers Pension Trust, which 
has over 500 participating employers and more than 112,000 participants, 
including active, retired, and terminated (vested) employees.135
Another kind of commercial trust is the investment or unit trust.136
These types of devices are often international in nature and also control a 
staggering amount of money.137 For example, in 2014, the largest British 
investment trust by assets (Alliance Trust) managed £3.2 billion in assets 
reflecting a global portfolio, with 46% of its holdings in North 
America.138 American investment trusts operate on a similar scale, with 
                                                                                                                     
nevertheless vast. See Younkyun Park, Employee Benefit Research Institute, NOTES, Apr. 2009, 
at 1, 2.
133. See OECD, PENSION MARKETS, supra note 132, at 7 (noting assets of private pension in 
OECD countries was in excess of $38 trillion in 2014). OPTrust, a Canadian pension plan, 
manages $19 billion in assets. See About OPTrust, OPTRUST, http://www.optrust.com/
aboutoptrust/default.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2017). The 1,000 largest U.S. retirement plans held 
assets of approximately $8.84 trillion in 2015. See James Comtois, Assets of Largest Retirement 
Funds Tumble 2.3% For Year, PENSIONS & INV. (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.pionline.com/
article/20160208/PRINT/302089971/assets-of-largest-retirement-funds-tumble-23-for-year. In 
early 2016, Japan’s Government Pension Investment Fund, said to be the world’s largest pension 
fund, reported a loss in excess of $50 billion, demonstrating the magnitude of these types of 
business entities as well as the public policy implications. See Robin Harding, Japan Pension 
Fund Loses $50bn, FIN. TIMES (July 29, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/9138aba6-555b-11e6-
befd-2fc0c26b3c60?mhq5j=e3 (noting the portfolio included domestic and international 
holdings). 
134. See Market Capitalization of Listed Domestic Companies (Current US$), WORLD 
BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD?end=2014&locations=US (last 
visited June 30, 2017).
135. See STEELWORKERS PENSION TR., http://www.steelworkerspension.com/. OPTrust, a 
Canadian pension plan, has approximately 90,000 members and retirees. See About OPTrust,
supra note 133.
136. The term “investment trust” is more common in the United States, with the term “unit 
trust” being used in England. See HAYTON ET AL., supra note 81, ¶ 1.122; Langbein, supra note 
8, at 170. For a brief description of the differences between unit and investment trusts, see Faith 
Glasgow, 10 Things You Need to Know About Investment Trusts, MONEYWISE (May 19, 2011), 
http://www.moneywise.co.uk/investing/funds/10-things-you-need-to-know-about-investment-
trusts.
137. See Bosques-Hernández, supra note 109, at 20. 
138. See Marc Shoffman, Top 20 Most Watched Investment Trusts: Investors Attracted to 
“Dividend Heroes”—and Size Isn’t Everything, THIS IS MONEY.CO.UK (Apr. 16, 2014), 
http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/investing/article-2604385/Most-viewed-investment-
trusts-revealed-performed.html.
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one industry member calculating the assets held by 181 providers of 
collective investment trusts to be approximately $2 trillion.139
Investment and unit trusts include a number of well-known types of 
commercial instruments, including mutual funds,140 REITs, which were 
the type of instrument seen in Americold,141 oil and gas royalty trusts,142
and asset securitization trusts.143 Some of these types of trusts (such as 
asset securitization trusts) may not involve a large number of 
shareholders and may not be unduly affected by the decision in 
Americold.144 However, other types of investment or unit trusts feature 
                                                                                                                     
139. See COALITION COLLECTIVE INV. TR., COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT TRUSTS 13 (2015), 
http://www.ctfcoalition.com/portalresource/CollectiveInvestmentTrustsWhitePaper.pdf
(estimated as of the fourth quarter of 2013); see also Kevin Mahn, Why Unit Investment Trusts 
Can Be a Good Investment Alternative, FORBES (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/advisor/2013/04/22/why-unit-investment-trusts-can-be-a-good-investment-alternative/
#3e950c8361ec (“According to the Investment Company Institute (ICI), data on the market value 
of unit investment trusts (UITs) issued and outstanding as of year-end 2012 indicates a total of 
5,787 trusts with a value of $71.73 billion.”).
140. Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 34 (“[M]ore than half of all mutual funds are organized as 
trusts.”) These are known as collective investment schemes in England. See HAYTON ET AL., supra
note 81, ¶ 1.122. 
141. See Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1014 (2016). REITs 
are mutual funds that invest in real property or in mortgages on real property. See Langbein, supra
note 8, at 171 (noting that in 1997, U.S.-based REITs held over $98 billion in assets). Interestingly, 
calls have been made to reduce, rather than increase, the regulation of REITs in the wake of the 
recent financial crisis, thereby showing the level of legislative support for these types of 
investment vehicles. See Bruce Arthur, Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 46 HARV.
J. LEGIS. 585, 589 (2009). 
142. Langbein, supra note 8, at 171. These types of trusts are often created by oil 
corporations that want a vehicle to hold legal title to certain oil-producing properties while 
dispensing beneficial assets to corporate shareholders. Id. The trust interests can be sold, and 
several of the larger oil-royalty trusts are publicly traded. See id. at 171–72. Trusts relating to 
royalties from intellectual property are also possible. See HAYTON ET AL., supra note 81, ¶ 1.135. 
143. See Kantor, supra note 98, at 20–22. In this form of trust, banks or other financial 
entities, often called originators or packagers, buy a type of debt (such as credit card receivables), 
“but then transfer[] [the debt] in trust to a separate trustee. Shares in that trust are sold to various 
participating investors, who, under the new scheme, are not lenders to the bank but share owners 
in the trust.” Langbein, supra note 8, at 172. Changes have been made to the specific rules 
regarding these types of investment vehicles in the wake of the recent financial crisis, but the 
concept remains viable. See Giacomo Rojas Elgueta, Divergences and Convergences of Common 
Law and Civil Law Traditions on Asset Partitioning: A Functional Analysis, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
517, 527–54 (2010); Peter A. Furci, U.S. Trade or Business Implications of Distressed-Debt 
Investing, 63 TAX LAW. 527, 537 (2010) (discussing U.S. regulations under the now-repealed 
Financial Asset Securitization Investment Trust (FASIT)); Grace Soyon Lee, What’s in a Name?: 
The Role of Danielson in the Taxation of Credit Card Securitizations, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 110, 
126 n.82 (2010) (noting FASITs were repealed in 2004 but recognizing the continued use of 
similar devices).
144. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1012 (holding that a trust’s members included its 
shareholders for purposes of diversity jurisdiction). Indeed, many commercial trusts operate very 
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large numbers of geographically diverse shareholders. For example, the 
Internal Revenue Code requires any entity seeking to be classified as a 
REIT to have at least one hundred beneficial owners.145 Some publicly 
traded REITs far exceed this minimum and offer millions of shares for 
individual or institutional purchase.146 The amount of money involved in 
these instruments is impressive. For example, as of August 31, 2016,
“there were 189 REITs listed on the New York Stock Exchange” with “a
combined equity market capitalization of $986 billion.”147
A third kind of commercial trust involves trusts relating to the 
issuance of bonds.148 In the United States, such trusts arise under the Trust 
Indenture Act,149 which requires “most debt securities issued in the
United States . . . to provide for the services of a corporate fiduciary to 
act as trustee for the bondholders or other obligees.”150
Trusts created under the Trust Indenture Act reflect certain unusual 
qualities.151 For example, trustees under bond indentures have fewer 
responsibilities for the trust property and typically do not enjoy 
possession or the right to possession until a default occurs.152 Instead:
The trustee under a bond indenture acts primarily under the 
terms of the contract creating the relationship, and acquires 
actual possession of the particular assets only in the event 
that the issuer breaches the covenants of the loan agreement. 
The indenture regime imposes, therefore, a species of 
contingent or standby trusteeship.
What commends the trust form for these corporate and 
municipal bond transactions is the ability to have a 
sophisticated financial intermediary—that is, a trust 
                                                                                                                     
much like secured loans or holding companies. See Kantor, supra note 98, at 16–22; Schwarcz, 
supra note 7, at 562–63 (describing structured finance deals).
145. See I.R.C. § 856(a)(5) (2012); Treas. Reg. 1.856-1(b)(6) (2016). Although many REITs 
are trusts, the Internal Revenue Code allows corporate entities to qualify as REITs. See I.R.C. 
§ 856(a). 
146. For example, one publicly traded REIT has over 96 million shares of common stock. 
See CIM Commercial Trust Announced Preliminary Results of Tender Offer, supra note 11. These 
numbers appear to contradict suggestions by some scholars that commercial trusts have smaller 
numbers of interested parties than do publicly traded corporations. See Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 
43. 
147. Understanding the Basics of REITs, REIT.COM, https://www.reit.com/investing/reit-
basics/faqs/basics-reits (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
148. See Kantor, supra note 98, at 16–20 (discussing bond indentures). 
149. 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa (2012).
150. Langbein, supra note 8, at 173 (estimating that as of 1997, the amount held in these 
types of trusts exceeded $3 trillion).
151. See 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa.
152. See Langbein, supra note 8, at 173–74.
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company—act on behalf of numerous and dispersed 
bondholders in the event that a loan transaction does not 
work out routinely. The indenture trustee overcomes the 
coordination problem that inheres in widespread public 
ownership of debt securities.153
Other countries also recognize the concept of bond-related trusts, 
whereby a trust deed gives a trustee both the responsibility and the 
authority to enforce the terms of the bonds held in the trust.154 Bond-
related trusts arise frequently in international disputes involving U.S. 
parties and thus may generate disputes heard in U.S. courts, thereby 
falling under the Americold rule.155 As with other types of commercial 
trusts, bond-related trusts account for billions of dollars’ worth of 
assets.156
A fourth type of commercial trust involves “the ‘regulatory 
compliance trust,’ [which is] a trust created primarily for the purpose of 
discharging responsibilities imposed by law.”157 These trusts include 
nuclear decommissioning trusts, environmental remediation trusts, 
liquidating trusts, prepaid funeral trusts, foreign insurers trusts, and law 
office trust accounts, just to name a few.158 Although a number of these 
types of trusts (for example, environmental remediation trusts and nuclear 
decommissioning trusts) are largely local in nature,159 others (such as 
                                                                                                                     
153. Id. at 174 (footnote omitted). A related type of device involves a trust created to 
establish a contingent value right (CVR) which requires an acquiring party “to pay additional 
consideration to a Target company’s stockholders following the close of the acquisition 
contingent on the occurrence of specified payment triggers.” Barbara L. Borden & Henry 
Gosebruch, Contingent Value Rights Outline, 1902 PLI/CORP. 323, 325 (Sept. 22–23, 2011); see 
also id. at 340 (noting CVRs can be “issued pursuant to a trust agreement”).
154. See, e.g., Law Debenture Tr. Corp. v. Elektrim S.A. [2009] EWHC 1801 ¶¶ 1, 11 (Ch) 
(Eng.). 
155. See Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012 (2016); Kantor, 
supra note 98, at 19–20. The existence of the Trust Indenture Act does not guarantee the existence 
of a federal question allowing for federal jurisdiction in cases involving bonds. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77aaa; Linda R. Hirshman, Whose Law Is It, Anyway? A Reconsideration of Federal Question 
Jurisdiction over Cases of Mixed State and Federal Law, 60 IND. L.J. 17, 46–47 (1984); Sarah L. 
Reid & Robert W. Schumacher, Automatic Assignability of Claims: The Tension Between Federal 
and New York State Law, 125 BANKING L.J. 725, 726 (2008); Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction 
and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 697 (2005).
156. See Mahn, supra note 139 (noting reports that at the end of 2012 there were “2,808 tax-
free bond trusts, with a market value of $15.76 billion” and “553 taxable bond trusts, with a market 
value of $4.06 billion”).
157. See Langbein, supra note 8, at 174.
158. See id. at 175–76. 
159. Examples of these types of trusts are publicly available. See SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMM’N, DECOMMISSIONING TRUST AGREEMENT FOR PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING 
STATION 1 (2006), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/31978/000119312506107242/
dex1003.htm (containing terms of a decommissioning trust agreement in El Paso); SEMPRA 
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foreign insurers trusts) are not and would therefore be affected by the rule 
in Americold.160 International insurance and reinsurance play a 
significant role in the U.S. economy,161 and requiring foreign insurers’
trusts to appear in state court rather than federal court as per the rule in 
Americold would doubtless cause numerous problems as a matter of both 
commercial and foreign relations.162
While there are numerous other types of commercial trusts in 
existence, it is unnecessary to outline them all, since the question for this 
Article is whether and to what extent the rule enunciated in Americold 
will detrimentally affect commercial practices. As this Section has 
shown, the effect of Americold will be both broad and deep, and will 
resonate across both the U.S. and global economies. It is possible that 
Congress could intend such a result. However, a closer comparison of 
commercial trusts and corporations suggests that the better approach 
would be to treat the two business forms similarly and allow commercial 
trusts to have the same sort of access to federal courts that corporations 
do.163
II. COMMERCIAL TRUSTS VERSUS CORPORATIONS
If Congress is to justify differential treatment of commercial trusts and 
corporations, there must be a discernable difference between the two 
types of business organizations. The following Subsections therefore 
compare the two business forms as both a practical and theoretical matter.
                                                                                                                     
ENERGY, NUCLEAR DECOMMISSIONING TRUST FUND (2014), https://www.sdge.com/sites/
default/files/documents/2004502471/NDTF.pdf (containing notice of terms of a nuclear 
decommissioning trust in San Diego).
160. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1015–16. A foreign insurer that wishes
to accept surplus lines insurance typically starts the process with an application 
for inclusion on the Quarterly Listing of Alien Insurers published by the 
International Insurers Department of the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC). This includes the establishment of a trust fund of no 
less than $5.4 million for the benefit of its U.S. policyholders, which is revalued 
annually based on U.S. liabilities.
John P. Dearie & Michael Griffin, Overseas Insurers, RISK MGMT. (Feb./Jan. 2009),
http://cf.rims.org/Magazine/PrintTemplate.cfm?AID=3835.
161. See S.I. Strong, The Special Nature of International Insurance and Reinsurance 
Arbitration: A Response to Professor Jerry, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 283, 314 n.229 (citing statistics 
indicating “that 62% of U.S. insurance premiums were ceded to offshore companies, although 
that number rises to 92% if the fact that many U.S. reinsurers are owned by foreign companies is 
taken into account”); see also infra notes 437–40 (regarding Lloyd’s of London).
162. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1015.
163. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012).
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A. Practical Issues
Professor Edward Purcell has claimed that “jurisdictional reform in 
the United States has been an intensely practical matter, a series of 
pragmatic responses to pressing real-world problems.”164 As a result, it is 
important to consider the practical differences between commercial trusts 
and corporations to see whether Congress should override the Supreme 
Court’s distinction between the two entities in matters involving diversity 
jurisdiction.165
One of the country’s leading experts on commercial trusts, Professor 
Schwarcz, has suggested that the key difference between corporations 
and commercial trusts is “the degree to which assets need to be placed at 
risk in order to satisfy the expectations of residual claimants.”166 Thus,
[i]n a corporation, the residual claims are sold to third-party 
investors (shareholders) who expect management to use 
corporate assets to obtain a profitable return on their 
investments. . . .
In contrast, a commercial trust’s residual claimant is 
typically the settlor of the trust, who . . . does not expect a 
risk-weighted return. The expectations of the trust’s senior 
and residual claimants are therefore the same: to preserve the 
value of the trust assets.167
As a result, commercial trusts and corporations are considered 
“mirror-image entities that respond to different investor needs.”168
Although commercial trusts differ from corporations in this regard, 
there are a number of important practical similarities between the two 
types of organizations. For example, commercial trusts reflect at least 
four attributes that are normally associated with corporations: centralized 
                                                                                                                     
164. Purcell, supra note 3, at 1825; see also Stephen N. Subrin, Procedure, Politics, 
Prediction, and Professors: A Response to Professors Burbank and Purcell, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
2151, 2153 (2008) (noting the role of politics).
165. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 91, § 1:15; KOVE ET AL., supra note 90, § 247. Some 
commentators have suggested that one of the key differences between commercial trusts and 
corporations is that the latter is created by statute and the former is created by agreement. See 
Sheldon A. Jones et al., The Massachusetts Business Trust and Registered Investment Companies,
13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 421, 423–24 (1988). While this may be true in some cases, many commercial 
trusts are statutory in nature. See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text. As a result, this 
Article will not consider this particular issue.
166. Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 561. 
167. Id. (footnote omitted); see also supra notes 119–20 and accompanying text (regarding 
residual interests in commercial and non-commercial trusts).
168. Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 561.
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management, continuity of existence, limited liability for the shareholder
beneficiaries, and transferability of ownership.169
Structurally, the commercial trust’s foundational document (the 
declaration or deed of trust) works like a corporation’s charter or articles 
of incorporation by establishing the business purpose(s) of the trust and 
setting forth the rights and responsibilities of both the trustees (who hold 
legal title to the trust) and the shareholder-beneficiaries (who hold 
certificates reflecting the nature and scope of their equitable title to the 
trust).170 The trustees of a commercial trust carry out duties similar to 
those of the board of directors of a corporation, although business is 
typically conducted in the trustees’ own names rather than that of the trust 
itself.171 Trustees of commercial trusts owe a fiduciary duty to 
shareholders and represent shareholders in a manner similar to that of the 
directors of a corporation, although fiduciary duties in the corporate
context are derivative in nature.172
In general, shareholder beneficiaries of a commercial trust have no 
duties of their own and are considered passive investors with the right to 
increase or relinquish ownership through the transfer of certificates as 
shares or units of interest.173 However, there are some variations on this 
theme.174 For example, 
[s]ome courts have held that to avoid individual shareholder 
liability the board of trustees must be a self-perpetuating 
body with the power to fill vacancies and that shareholders 
must be denied all rights except the right to receive dividends 
and their distributive shares of the assets on termination of 
the enterprise.175
Other jurisdictions indicate that shareholders are not personally liable 
unless they have the “ultimate power of control.”176 Commentators have 
suggested that various types of indirect control (such as the ability to elect 
trustees, fill vacancies on the board of trustees, amend the declaration of 
trust or dissolve the trust as a whole) should not provide sufficient 
grounds for shareholder liability.177 Notably, these powers, which 
resemble the power of majority control seen in many corporations, far 
                                                                                                                     
169. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 91, § 1:15. Trustees retain personal liability unless the 
deed of trust or contract with the creditor indicates otherwise. See id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. KOVE ET AL., supra note 90, § 247.
175. COX & HAZEN, supra note 91, § 1:15. 
176. Id.
177. Id.
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exceed those given to beneficiaries of non-commercial trusts absent 
settlor consent.178 As a result of these and other corporate influences on 
commercial trusts, the overwhelming majority of authorities view 
commercial trusts as the functional equivalents of corporations.179
B. Theoretical Issues
Although most comparisons of corporations and commercial trusts 
have focused on practical concerns, Congress may find it useful to 
consider the theoretical nature of the two devices when determining its 
response to Americold.180 If commercial trusts can be considered the 
theoretical equivalents of corporations as well as their functional 
equivalents, then there appears to be little if any reason to allow the rule 
in Americold to stand.181 In fact, as the following discussion shows, there 
are significant similarities between the theoretical purposes of 
commercial trusts and corporations, which would suggest a similar need 
for access to federal courts.
1. Commercial Trusts
Although the legal community has long been aware of the many 
practical similarities involving commercial trusts and corporations, little 
if any attention has been devoted to theoretical comparisons between the 
two business forms.182 Initially, it might appear as if commercial trusts 
had little theoretical overlap with corporations, given the predominance 
of the donative theory of trust law.183 This theory states that trusts are not 
contracts but instead reflect “a unilateral transfer of assets to a person 
                                                                                                                     
178. See id. § 1:15 n.15 (citing Massachusetts Supreme Court); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 51, 57–59, 60, 64–65 (AM. LAW INST. 2001).
179. See Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 548 (1928); Miller, supra note 7, at 446 n.8; 
Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 560; Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 32.
180. Commentators have debated whether and to what extent theory describes or drives legal 
reform. See Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 
W. VA. L. REV. 173, 176 (1985); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 
201, 241–43; Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the Corporation, 21 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061, 1063 (1994).
181. See Hemphill, 277 U.S. at 548 (noting functional equivalence of two business forms); 
Miller, supra note 7, at 444; Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 560; Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 31.
182. See, e.g., Edward M. Iacobucci & George G. Triantis, Economic and Legal Boundaries 
of Firms, 93 VA. L. REV. 515, 570 (2007) (offering a single unsupported, conclusory statement); 
Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80, 126–27 
(1991) (offering a limited analysis focusing on contract theory of the corporation); Sitkoff, supra
note 7, at 45 (noting the need for this type of theoretical analysis). But see E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., 
Dogma and Practice in the Law of Associations, 42 HARV. L. REV. 977, 989–91 (1929) (discussing 
theoretical issues involving corporations and commercial trusts in the context of Hemphill, 277 
U.S. 537).
183. See Strong, supra note 79, at 1174–75 (discussing U.S. and English law).
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prepared to accept the office of trustee with the benefits and burdens 
attached to such office.”184
The donative theory of trust law was initially promoted in the United 
States by Austin Scott, the Reporter of the first Restatement of Trusts, as 
a means of guaranteeing that trust law remained with the specialist equity 
bench rather than being subsumed into the common law.185 “[F]or Scott, 
having the Restatement deny the contractarian character of the trust was 
a means of buttressing the jury-free preserve of equity judges . . . .”186 As 
a result, the Restatement of Trusts considers only two types of trusts (the 
constructive trust and the resulting trust, which both arise as remedial 
measures as a matter of law) to be non-donative in nature.187
However, commercial trusts exist in something of a theoretical limbo. 
Both the second and third iterations of the Restatement of Trusts 
expressly exclude commercial trusts from their purview, which suggests 
that commercial trusts could be subject to a different theoretical 
paradigm.188 The most logical candidate is the contractual theory of 
trusts, which had the support of numerous scholars (including Frederic 
Maitland) prior to the adoption of the first Restatement.189 A number of 
contemporary commentators, most notably Professor John Langbein, also 
favor this characterization of trust law. As Professor Langbein has stated:
[A]lthough the typical trust implements a donative transfer, 
it embodies a contract-like relationship in the underlying 
deal between the settlor and the trustee about how the trustee 
will manage the trust assets and distribute them to the trust 
beneficiaries. The difference between a trust and a third-
party beneficiary contract is largely a lawyers’
conceptualism.190
                                                                                                                     
184. HAYTON ET AL., supra note 81, ¶ 11.83; see also Strong, supra note 79, at 1174–81
(discussing the contractual theory, donative theory, and alternative theories of trust law).
185. See Langbein, supra note 81, at 627, 644–45, 648–50. 
186. Id. at 649.
187. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 7 & cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2001).
188. See id. § 1, cmt. b; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 1 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1959).
There has been some suggestion that an “agency cost theory” could apply to commercial trusts, 
but that work is still at a relatively early stage of development. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency 
Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 623–24 (2004) (limiting the analysis to 
donative trusts but suggesting it may be applicable to commercial trusts in the future); Lee-ford 
Tritt, The Limitations of an Economic Agency Cost Theory of Trust Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV.
2579, 2587 n.13 (2011) (referring to the importance and significance of commercial trusts yet still 
putting them outside the scope of the private trust analysis).
189. See Langbein, supra note 81, at 627, 644–45, 648–50. 
190. Langbein, supra note 8, at 185 (citation omitted). Other commentators have noted that 
even if the contractarian approach is considered “unsuitable for the two-party declaration of 
trust . . . such an observation in no way invalidates the contract approach to the more traditional 
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Under this approach, the trust is viewed as “a deal, a bargain about 
how the trust assets are to be managed and distributed.”191
Although Professor Langbein was focusing primarily on traditional 
intergenerational trusts, the persuasiveness of the contractarian theory of 
trust law is even more pronounced in the case of the commercial trust, 
since those devices are bereft of any type of donative element.192 Indeed, 
even if traditional intergenerational trusts cannot be seen as having a 
contractual nature, commercial trusts, which reflect “an arm’s-length, 
negotiated bargain in which all parties benefit,” cannot realistically be 
viewed in any other light.193
While U.S.-trained lawyers view the contractual theory of trusts as 
conflicting with the donative theory of trusts, not every country 
experiences the same type of jurisprudential tension. Instead, a number 
of jurisdictions, particularly certain civil law nations that have adopted 
their own domestic version of the trust, view these instruments through 
an exclusively contractual lens.194
Trusts can also be conceptualized by reference to their intended 
purpose.195 The primary purpose test is often used by bankruptcy courts 
to determine whether a particular entity is a commercial trust that is 
eligible for protection under the Bankruptcy Code or a family trust that is 
intended to preserve the res and thus is not eligible for protection under 
the Bankruptcy Code.196 However, these principles can be used in other 
                                                                                                                     
three-party trust where the grantor does not act as the trustee.” Michael P. Bruyere & Meghan D. 
Marino, Mandatory Arbitration Provisions: A Powerful Tool to Prevent Contentious and Costly 
Trust Litigation, but Are They Enforceable?, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 351, 362 (2007); see 
Langbein, supra note 81, at 627, 645. The two-party declaration trust, also known as a self-
declarative trust, arises when a settlor declares him or herself to be the trustee of certain identified 
property for the benefit of another person rather than naming another person to act as trustee. See 
HAYTON ET AL., supra note 81, ¶¶ 12.7–12.8; MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 81, at 374. Notably, 
self-declarative trusts are virtually never seen in the commercial context. See id. at 374–75; 
Langbein, supra note 81, at 672.
191. Langbein, supra note 81, at 627. 
192. See id. at 631.
193. See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 563. Some commentators, most notably Professor Larry 
Ribstein, have relied on the commercial trust as a means of suggesting that corporation law can 
and should be characterized pursuant to a type of contract theory. See Ribstein, supra note 182,
at 126–27 (noting that the “Delaware business trust statute demonstrates that the states are 
approaching full-fledged recognition of the contract theory of the corporation”).
194. Trusts developed as common law devices and thus were not traditionally seen in civil 
law countries. However, a growing number of civilian legal systems have adopted trust-like 
instruments. See COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, COMMERCIAL TRUSTS IN EUROPEAN 
PRIVATE LAW 4 (Michele Graziadei et al. eds., 2009); Strong, supra note 79, at 1159 n.1.
195. See Ossip, supra note 117, at 2332.
196. See In re Kenneth Allen Knight Tr., 303 F.3d 671, 676 (6th Cir. 2002); In re Universal 
Clearing House Co., 60 B.R. 985, 991 (D. Utah 1986); In re Metro Palms I Tr., 153 B.R. 922, 923 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993); In re Hemex Liquidation Tr., 129 B.R. 91, 97–98 (Bankr. W.D. La. 
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contexts as well.197 Thus, it can be argued that if the primary purpose of 
the trust is to conduct a for-profit business, as is the case with commercial 
trusts,198 then that entity should be treated as akin to a corporation, 
another for-profit entity, for the purpose of diversity jurisdiction.199
While this approach could be criticized as inefficient and potentially 
unpredictable to the extent it would require courts to undertake a case-
by-case analysis, the distinction between a trust created on a for-profit 
basis and a trust that is created to hold and maintain personal property 
appears relatively clear.200
Other analytical paradigms also exist. For example, it might be 
possible to construct a theory of trust law that focuses on an entity’s
governance structure and the way in which the entity interacts with its 
surroundings (i.e., its exogenous effect).201 This type of functional 
approach suggests a strong correlation between commercial trusts and 
corporations, based on the way in which the two types of business 
organizations operate in the marketplace.202
2. Corporations
Like trusts, corporations are subject to a variety of theoretical 
constructs.203 Theorization of corporation law is somewhat more mature 
than that of trust law and includes a number of sub-specialties focusing 
on different aspects of corporate practice.204 The most relevant paradigm 
                                                                                                                     
1991); In re Medallion Realty Tr., 103 B.R. 8, 11–12 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); In re Treasure 
Island Land Tr., 2 B.R. 332, 334 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4 (2016); David 
S. Jennis & Kathleen L. DiSanto, Trust or Debtor: You Decide, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2013, 
at 34, 34. Other bankruptcy courts adopt a balancing test that considers whether the trust has a 
business purpose, title is held by a trustee, management is carried out in a centralized manner, the 
trust’s continuity would be uninterrupted by the death of a beneficial owner, the trust’s interests 
are transferable, and the trust allows for limited liability. See Morrissey v. Comm’r, 296 U.S. 344, 
359–60 (1935); Jennis & DiSanto, supra, at 34; see also Swanson v. Comm’r, 296 U.S. 362, 365 
(1935); Helvering v. Combs, 296 U.S. 365, 368–69 (1935); Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert 
Assocs., 296 U.S. 369, 374 (1935).
197. See Schwarcz, supra note 26, at 327–28 (considering the purpose of commercial trusts). 
198. See KOVE ET AL., supra note 90, § 247 (“[T]he business trust is organized not as a means 
of effecting a gift or transfer but as a device for profit making through the combination of capital 
contributed by a number of investors.”). 
199. See Ossip, supra note 117, at 2332–33.
200. See id.
201. See Schwarcz, supra note 26, at 327.
202. See supra Section II.A.
203. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 40, at 3–4; Millon, supra note 180, at 201 
(discussing the historical evolution of theories of the corporation, including the artificial entity 
theory, the natural entity theory and the aggregate theory).
204. For example, some commentators speak of the “contractarian” theory of corporations, 
which refers to the corporation’s freedom to enter into various contracts. See Matheson & Olson, 
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for the current analysis involves the various bases for corporate 
personhood, which include 
(i) the concession or “artificial entity” theory, which sees the 
corporation as a creation of the state or sovereign that grants 
its charter; (ii) the aggregate theory, which sees the 
corporation as a fictional construct representing the sum of 
its shareholders, managers, and other constituencies who 
contribute to the success of the corporate enterprise; and (iii) 
the real entity view, which sees the corporation, not as an 
extension of the state or of its many constituencies, but as 
having a separate identity independent of both.205
Although more research should, of course, be done, each of these 
theories appears easily applicable to commercial trusts. For example, the 
artificial entity theory, which is commonly associated with the jurist 
Friedrich Carl von Savigny despite earlier connections to Roman, 
English, and American law, holds that 
because legal persons could only have recognized rights and 
duties as a consequence of an act of the State, they were 
nothing but artificial beings or fictions. . . . [D]ue to its 
artificial personality, a firm could only have a very limited 
set of rights and duties, namely those pertaining to 
property.206
Although this theory has been called into question by contemporary 
corporate law scholars, it still carries some weight in the academic 
community.207 Notably, the artificial entity theory can be used to describe 
commercial trusts, which are also subject to various legal restrictions and 
focus primarily on matters relating to the use and disposition of 
property.208
The second means of conceptualizing corporate personhood is the 
aggregate theory, which characterizes a legal entity’s legal rights and 
duties as indirect or derivative in nature and holds that the rights and 
obligations of the shareholders or other individuals that make up the 
                                                                                                                     
supra note 40, at 32; Ribstein, supra note 182, at 84. However, those inquiries are not directly 
relevant to the current discussion, since they focus on a single aspect of corporate practice.
205. Ho, supra note 49, at 891–92 (footnote omitted). These paradigms are most appropriate 
for this study because the current analysis focuses on questions of citizenship—an issue that is 
closely related to personhood—for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. 
206. Martin Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm—From Nature to Function, 
118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2013) (footnotes omitted).
207. See id. at 14.
208. See id.; see also supra Subsection I.B.2.
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entity are coextensive with the legal entity itself.209 Like the artificial 
entity theory, the aggregate theory has been criticized, although it retains 
a number of adherents.210 Furthermore, this theory can be used to explain 
commercial trusts, particularly given the way in which trusts split 
ownership of the trust res into legal and equitable title.211 Only by 
combining those two interests can a court truly appreciate the nature of 
the trust’s rights and responsibilities.
The last of the traditional theories of the corporation, the real entity 
theory, has been credited with promoting the development of a number 
of different concepts in corporate law, including limited liability of 
corporations, tortious and limited criminal liability of corporations, and 
the corporate tax regime.212 Commentators have also relied on the real 
entity theory to justify corporate claims to various constitutional rights, 
including “freedom of the press, commercial speech, and protections 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, among others.”213 While 
some of these issues have not yet been considered in the context of 
commercial trusts, courts have held that a number of these principles—
most notably limited liability, tortious and criminal liability, and freedom 
of speech—apply to commercial trusts, thereby suggesting a theoretical 
coalescence between corporations and commercial trusts.214
As popular as these three paradigms have been, they have been largely 
replaced by the nexus of contracts theory, which is now the dominant 
theoretical construct in contemporary corporation law.215 The nexus of 
contracts theory adopts a functional approach to the question of corporate 
identity and frames the corporation as the aggregate of “various explicit 
                                                                                                                     
209. See Petrin, supra note 206, at 10.
210. See id. at 14–15.
211. See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text. 
212. See Petrin, supra note 206, at 11–13.
213. Id. at 13.
214. See 29 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01(B)(1) (West 2016) (defining a person as 
including a business trust for purposes of the criminal code); Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 364 (2010) (stating the First Amendment does not allow Congress to 
limit speech “based on the corporate identity of the speaker and the content of the political 
speech”); United States v. Hughes, 191 F.3d 1317, 1319 (10th Cir. 1999) (involving a criminal
conviction of a commercial trust for conspiracy to defraud the government); DeRosier v. 5931 
Bus. Tr., 870 F. Supp. 941, 944 (D. Minn. 1994) (featuring a commercial trust as a defendant in 
a trademark infringement action).
215. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation Is a Nexus of 
Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 819 (1998); Petrin, supra note 
206, at 33; see also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310–11 
(1976) (first establishing the theory). This paradigm is slightly different than the “contractarian” 
theory of corporations, which refers to the corporation’s freedom to enter into various contracts. 
See Matheson & Olson, supra note 40, at 32.
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and implicit contracts between the firm’s constituencies.”216 As such, the 
nexus of contracts theory bears certain similarities to earlier theories of 
the corporation.217
The nexus of contracts theory has been widely embraced by the 
corporate law community and particularly by adherents of the law and 
economics movement.218 However, the theory has been challenged on 
various grounds.219 For example, the nexus of contracts theory is said to 
be “unsatisfactory as a positive—that is, descriptive—matter, in part 
because the corporation has a dual nature: In one aspect, it consists of 
reciprocal arrangements; in another, it is a bureaucratic hierarchy. The 
nexus-of-contracts conception captures only one of these two aspects of 
the corporation.”220
Although this criticism may be worrisome for corporate theorists, it 
need not affect the current analysis, since the focus of this Section is on 
whether and to what extent commercial trusts can be considered 
analogous to corporations as a matter of theory. Regardless of whether
the nexus of contracts theory is characterized as unitary or binary in 
nature, the concept of a business entity that consists of “a nexus of 
reciprocal arrangements” can also be used to describe commercial 
trusts.221 Furthermore, some of the other problems with the nexus of 
contracts theory cannot be said to apply to commercial trusts. 
For example, the nexus of contract theory has experienced certain 
theoretical difficulties in the corporate context regarding the applicability 
of mandatory rules of law.222 For example, some commentators seeking 
to justify the nexus of contracts theory have attempted to argue that 
corporations are not generally subject to certain mandatory rules of 
law.223 Setting aside whether the inapplicability of mandatory rules of law 
can even be said to be central to the nexus of contract theory (something 
                                                                                                                     
216. Petrin, supra note 206, at 34.
217. See id.
218. Eisenberg, supra note 215, at 819.
219. See id. at 820.
220. Id. at 819; see also Douglas Litowitz, The Corporation as God, 30 J. CORP. L. 501, 522 
(2005) (“[C]orporate law never comes down one way or the other on whether the modern 
corporation is a public entity (hence a social actor) or a purely private entity (and hence an 
economic relationship).”).
221. Eisenberg, supra note 215, at 822–24 (noting that this formulation may be somewhat 
inaccurate, despite its prevalence); see also infra note 351 and accompanying text (noting 
commercial trusts’ responsiveness to market forces).
222. Eisenberg, supra note 215, at 823–24; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and 
Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 856, 860 (1997) (reviewing PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. 
Mitchell ed., 1995)). 
223. Eisenberg, supra note 215, at 823.
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that Professor Melvin Eisenberg doubts),224 commercial trusts are 
commonly considered to be much more flexible than corporations, which 
suggests they suffer less than corporations with respect to this aspect of 
the nexus of contracts theory.225
Scholars have also struggled with the way in which the nexus of 
contracts theory conceives of shareholders as only holding a contractual 
claim against the corporation rather than as acting as owners of the 
corporation.226 However, commercial trusts have far fewer difficulties in 
this regard, since legal title to the trust property is vested in the trustees 
rather than in the shareholder-beneficiaries, who simply hold a breach of 
trust (similar in this regard to a breach of contract) claim against the 
trustees.227 Indeed, when discussing this issue in the corporate context, 
Professor Eisenberg specifically mentions Professor Tony Honoré’s 
example of “split ownership” as exemplifying the nexus of contracts 
theory,228 which of course accords nicely with standard principles of trust 
law.229
Another criticism of the nexus of contracts theory involves the notion 
that “a corporation . . . is not only a hierarchical organization; it is a 
bureaucratic hierarchical organization. That means, among other things, 
that much of the activity in a corporation is organized by established 
bureaucratic rules that are not open to continued reexamination, let alone 
negotiation.”230 While this issue may be problematic for corporations, 
commercial trusts experience few difficulties in this regard, since 
commercial trusts are much more flexible than corporations with respect 
to questions of corporate governance and can therefore be said to be more 
amenable to amendment of their internal rules.231
                                                                                                                     
224. See id.
225. See supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text.
226. See Eisenberg, supra note 215, at 825.
227. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TRUSTS §§ 93, 95, 100 (AM. LAW INST. 2001). In a 
corporation, the assets of the corporation are held by the corporation itself. See 3 TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 19:4 (database updated Dec. 2016) (describing the classificaton of 
assets owned by a corporation).
228. Eisenberg, supra note 215, at 825–26 (citing A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD 
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961)); see also supra notes 81–85 and 
accompanying text (describing the standard principles of trust law).
229. See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text (describing the standard principles of 
trust law).
230. Eisenberg, supra note 215, at 829; see also Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, 
Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 1619, 1641 (2001) (advancing a theory of the firm according to which the firm’s boundary 
is determined pursuant to whether it is efficient to structure behavior according to non-legally 
enforceable rules and standards as opposed to contract and third party rules).
231. See supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text.
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The nexus of contracts theory is often used to describe a single 
corporate unit.232 However, corporations do not always operate as 
singular entities. Instead, several corporate entities may work together as 
part of a unified commercial endeavor,233 a feature that they share with 
commercial trusts.234 As a result, it is necessary to consider whether and 
to what extent commercial trusts fall within theoretical constructs 
describing corporate groups. 
Corporate groups are often described pursuant to either the enterprise 
theory or the entity theory.235 The enterprise theory “views all of the legal 
entities that comprise the corporate group as part of a single economic 
organization, while the entity view emphasize[s] the separate legal 
identity of the affiliates that together form the corporate group.”236
Notably, both paradigms can easily be used to describe groups of 
commercial trusts.
Professor Virginia Harper Ho has considered how the entity theory 
and enterprise theory correlate with the three traditional theories of 
corporate personhood discussed above (i.e., the concession theory, the 
aggregate theory, and the real entity theory)237 and sought to correlate 
these individual theories with the two standard theories of corporate 
groups (i.e., the entity theory and the enterprise theory).238 Not only was 
she successful in integrating these two different lines of thought regarding 
corporate personhood, but her approach—which she reflected visually in 
the form of a two-dimensional chart—can be adapted for use with 
commercial trusts as well.239 Thus, a theoretical construct of the 
personhood of commercial trusts, based on standard corporate law 
theories, might be reflected as follows.
                                                                                                                     
232. E.g., Eisenberg, supra note 215, at 819.
233. This often happens in the capital market and asset securitization contexts. See Kantor, 
supra note 98, at 16–22.
234. See id. (noting how a single transaction can involve multiple related trust vehicles).
235. See Ho, supra note 49, at 897–98 (noting that these theories were initially developed in 
the context of tort and statutory liability).
236. Id. at 898. One commentator has claimed that commercial trusts should be considered 
singular entities, given that they can operate on a nationwide basis. See Christy, supra note 11, at 
151.
237. See supra notes 204–14 and accompanying text.
238. See Ho, supra note 49, at 902 (creating a chart for analysis of corporate personhood).
239. See id.
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Theories of Commercial Trusts in Two Dimensions240
Entity approach Enterprise approach
Concession 
Theory
Commercial trusts are 
created solely by operation 
of state law. 
Commercial trusts are 
allowed to operate across state 
or national borders and thus 
are subject to multiple laws. 
Aggregate 
Theory
Commercial trusts are 
fictional constructs 
representing the sum of the 
interests of the 
beneficiaries.
Commercial trusts are
fictional constructs 
representing numerous 
individual interests of the 
beneficiaries.
Real Entity 
Theory
Commercial trusts have a 
separate identity greater 
than the sum of their 
individual beneficiaries.
Commercial trusts’ identities
reflect the disparate views of 
the individual beneficiaries.
As the above discussion shows, commercial trusts can easily fall 
within most if not all of the primary theoretical constructs relating to 
corporations. These theoretical similarities, combined with the many 
functional similarities between the two business forms,241 strongly 
suggest that Congress should treat the two entities the same way in 
questions relating to diversity jurisdiction unless there is some procedural 
reason to distinguish between the two types of business associations. That 
issue is considered in the next Part.
III. DIVERSITY JURISDICTION AND COMMERCIAL TRUSTS
The Supreme Court’s decision in Americold is consistent with 
conventional wisdom suggesting that the Court is seeking to reduce the 
federal judicial caseload by limiting the number of cases that qualify for 
diversity jurisdiction.242 To some extent, the Court’s efforts appear to 
have been successful, based on statistics indicating that the number of 
cases relying on diversity jurisdiction dropped by 17% between 2014 and 
                                                                                                                     
240. The following chart is an adaptation—focused on the personhood of commercial trusts 
rather than personhood of corporations—of Professor Ho’s chart analyzing corporate personhood. 
See id.
241. See Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 550 (1928) (noting the functional equivalence of 
two business forms); Miller, supra note 7, at 448; Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 560; Sitkoff, supra
note 7, at 31.
242. See Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1015–17 (2016); 
Cooper & Nielson, supra note 13, at 300–04 (discussing various ways that federal courts interpret 
and apply rules regarding complete diversity so as to restrict access to federal courts). 
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2015.243 Although this Article does not take a position on whether 
decreasing diversity jurisdiction is wise as a general proposition,244 it
does seem that commercial trusts should be exempt from those initiatives 
for a variety of practical and theoretical reasons.245 This conclusion 
derives not only as a matter of trust and corporation law but also as a 
matter of procedural law.
In many ways, Americold appears to be a routine procedural decision 
that applies equally to all potential parties.246 Under the Supreme Court’s 
current ruling, no one—neither the trustees, the shareholder-beneficiaries 
nor anyone suing the trust—will likely be able to establish complete 
diversity and reap the benefits of federal court absent some sort of federal
question.247 This result will often arise by virtue of the sheer number of 
shareholder-beneficiaries found in many commercial trusts.248 However, 
difficulties can also arise in cases involving smaller trusts, since “the trust 
may not have information as to its ultimate beneficial owners, much less 
information as to their citizenship.”249
Although Americold can be said to reflect a type of formal neutrality 
among potential parties,250 this quality does not necessarily save the 
decision when it is considered in light of the original purpose of diversity 
                                                                                                                     
243. See Federal Judicial Center Caseload Statistics 2015, U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2015 (last visited 
June 30, 2017) (noting that, in 2015, 87,772 cases out of a total of 281,608 civil disputes relied 
on diversity jurisdiction). But see Purcell, supra note 3, at 1845 (suggesting that statistical data 
has actually “had relatively little impact on the rules of federal jurisdiction”). However, the 
number of cases involving diversity jurisdiction were still 41% greater in 2015 than in 2006. See 
Federal Judicial Center Caseload Statistics 2015, supra. These figures are particularly salient to 
the current discussion, given data suggesting that corporations constitute a significant proportion 
of the diversity cases heard in federal court. See Debra R. Cohen, Citizenship of Limited Liability 
Companies for Diversity Jurisdiction, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 435, 437 nn.6–7 (2002).
244. Other commentators have addressed this issue at length. See C. Douglas Floyd, The 
Limits of Minimal Diversity, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 613, 694 (2004); Rodney K. Miller, Article III and 
Removal Jurisdiction: The Demise of the Complete Diversity Rule and a Proposed Return to 
Minimal Diversity, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 269, 278 (2012) (suggesting return to a rule of minimal 
diversity for diversity jurisdiction). 
245. See supra Part II.
246. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1014.
247. See id. at 1016; Rutledge & Schaefer, supra note 12, at 104. While some types of suits 
might still be able to proceed under Navarro, that rule is somewhat in doubt given the discussion 
in Americold. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1016; Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 100 S. Ct. 1779, 
1789–90  (1980). At the very least, significant litigation will arise to define the circumstances in 
which Navarro applies. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1017.
248. See supra Subsection I.B.2.
249. Rutledge & Schaefer, supra note 12, at 104 (noting this issue may be particularly acute 
in certain types of disputes, such as those involving structured financing); see also Sitkoff, supra
note 7, at 34 (noting that commercial trusts are “widely used in structured finance transactions”).
250. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1017.
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jurisdiction.251 As Justice Joseph Story explained in Martin v. Hunter’s 
Lessee,252 the Framers did not intend diversity jurisdiction “to be
exercised exclusively for the benefit of parties who might be plaintiffs, 
and would elect the national forum, but also for the protection of 
defendants who might be entitled to try their rights, or assert their 
privileges, before the same forum.”253 The Supreme Court relied on this 
rationale in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad,254 when it held that 
corporations could not deprive their opponents of the constitutional right 
to have their disputes heard in federal court simply by eliminating 
diversity through the election of corporate directors from every U.S. 
state.255
Although Martin and Marshall were decided in the mid-nineteenth 
century, concerns about rules that allow or require the virtual elimination 
of diversity jurisdiction are just as relevant today.256 For example, the 
Supreme Court expressly acknowledged the problems associated with 
overly restrictive approaches to diversity jurisdiction in 2010 in Hertz 
Corp. v. Friend,257 when it noted that the purpose of diversity jurisdiction 
was to increase access to the federal courts.258 Although Hertz 
acknowledged the need to limit excessive federal litigation, the decision 
also recognized that, in 1951, a special committee of the Judicial 
Conference had cited “a general need ‘to prevent fraud and abuses’ with 
respect to federal jurisdiction” and had suggested corporations be 
considered citizens not only of the state in which they were incorporated 
but also citizens of the place where the corporation had its principal place 
                                                                                                                     
251. See id. at 1014, 1015.
252. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
253. Id. at 348; see also Christy, supra note 11, at 151 (discussing this issue in the context 
of commercial trusts).
254. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1854), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012).
255. See id. at 328. Marshall was the last in a trilogy of cases dealing with corporate 
citizenship prior to the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); 
Marshall, 57 U.S. at 328; Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 
497, 558 (1844), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); Bank of the United States v. 
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809), overruled in part on other grounds by Louisville, 
Cincinnati & Charleston R.R., 43 U.S. at 497; Oh, supra note 4, at 421–22.
256. See Marshall, 57 U.S. at 328; Martin, 14 U.S. at 304. Some commentators have 
suggested that such a rule is necessary to preserve states’ rights, see Ossip, supra note 117, at 
2331, but that perspective appears to ignore the purpose and history of diversity jurisdiction. See 
Jesse M. Cross, National “Harmony”: An Inter-Branch Constitutional Principle and Its 
Application to Diversity Jurisdiction, 93 NEB. L. REV. 139, 155–57 (2014).
257. 559 U.S. 77 (2010).
258. See id. at 86; see also Chaplin, supra note 40, at 98–99 (discussing questions of 
corporate citizenship after Hertz).
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of business.259 In 1958, this recommendation was adopted by Congress 
in slightly modified form and is now reflected in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(c)(1).260
While the Court, Congress, and the Judicial Conference have 
considered citizenship of corporations in various contexts, these bodies 
have not engaged in the same degree of debate about citizenship of 
commercial trusts. However, it may be time to do so, since, as the 
following Subsections show, the rule in Americold gives rise to a 
significant number of theoretical and practical problems as a matter of 
procedural law and practice.261
A. Theoretical Issues
Although diversity jurisdiction has been routinely criticized for 
several decades, the mechanism nevertheless continues to provide an 
important means of access to the federal courts.262 Over the years, 
diversity jurisdiction has been rationalized on a variety of different 
grounds,263 and Congress should keep these rationales in mind when 
considering the legislative proposals contained herein.264
                                                                                                                     
259. Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 86 (citing REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE REGULAR 
ANNUAL MEETING AND SPECIAL MEETING (Sept. 24–26 & Mar. 19–20, 1951), H.R. DOC. NO. 365, 
at 14 (2d Sess. 1952)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012). For varying views on the history 
of diversity jurisdiction, see Bassett, supra note 3, at 122–31; Cooper & Nielson, supra note 13,
at 295–98; Cross, supra note 256, at 155–57; Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity 
Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 492 (1928); Deidre Mask & Paul MacMahon, The 
Revolutionary War Prize Cases and the Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 477 
(2015); Wood, supra note 17, at 593. For a history of alienage jurisdiction as distinguished from 
diversity jurisdiction, see Oh, supra note 4, at 440–41.
260. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 88.
261. Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012 (2016).
262. See Cross, supra note 256, at 152–54; Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular 
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 411 (1906), reprinted in 
40 AM. L. REV. 729, 744–45 (1906); Purcell, supra note 3, at 1833–35 (noting some academics 
believe that diversity jurisdiction is indefensible as a matter of legal theory); Sharon E. Rush, 
Federalism, Diversity, Equality, and Article III Judges: Geography, Identity, and Bias, 79 MO. L.
REV. 119, 136 (2014). In 1990, a Congressional report concluded that “[i]n most diversity 
cases . . . there is no substantial need for a federal forum.” JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 40 (1990); see also Larry Kramer, Diversity 
Jurisdiction, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 98. However, the Committee “strongly recommend[ed]” 
the elimination of diversity jurisdiction, save for “complex multi-state litigation, interpleader, and 
suits involving aliens.” JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra, at 38–39. Notably, the debate 
about eliminating or curtailing diversity jurisdiction “has left alienage jurisdiction unscathed,” 
which is an important feature, given the significant number of commercial trusts with actual or 
potential international contacts. Oh, supra note 4, at 439; see also supra notes 26, 72, 137, 155, 
161 and accompanying text.
263. Cross, supra note 256, at 155–57.
264. See id. at 146 (noting the importance of theory to legislative practice).
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Any analysis of diversity jurisdiction begins with the text contained 
in the Constitution265 and the First Judiciary Act,266 as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court in cases such as Strawbridge v. Curtiss267 and Bank of the 
United States v. Deveaux.268 In the latter decision, Chief Justice John 
Marshall recognized that diversity jurisdiction was not only meant to 
avoid actual bias by state court judges against parties from other 
jurisdictions but was also intended to eliminate potential and perceived 
biases.269 This approach focuses on the facilitation of interstate and 
international commerce “by reassuring wary parties that interstate 
activities or transactions will not subject them to suits in state courts that 
might be infected with local bias.”270
This theory is clearly relevant to cases involving commercial trusts,
given the national and international nature of many commercial trusts and 
the role that commercial trusts play in the U.S. and global economies.271
Given the competitive nature of interstate and international commerce, 
Congress should be cautious about any jurisdictional rule, including the 
one enunciated in Americold, that affects (or is believed to affect) the fair, 
efficient and neutral resolution of disputes involving a particular type of 
commercial organization, since that can diminish parties’ willingness to 
do business in a particular location.272
Another theory involving diversity jurisdiction arose as a result of the 
United States’ increasing participation in international affairs.273 Under 
this view, diversity jurisdiction, broadly defined to include alienage 
jurisdiction, was justified as a means of ensuring foreign parties’ access 
                                                                                                                     
265. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
266. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 11–12, 1 Stat. 73, 78–80 (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. § 1332 (2012)); Purcell, supra note 3, at 1830.
267. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
268. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809), overruled in part by Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston 
R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
269. See Deveaux, 9 U.S. at 67, 87; Cross, supra note 256, at 148–49; Friendly, supra note 
259, at 492.
270. Cross, supra note 256, at 149; see also Rush, supra note 262, at 157 (noting concerns 
that a state court “judge ‘will find a way,’ perhaps unwittingly, to rule in favor of the resident”). 
Concerns about bias are particularly pressing given that so many state court judges are subject to
election, either initially or through confirmation elections. See id. at 159; Wood, supra note 17, at 
599; see also infra note 288 (regarding judicial elections).
271. See supra notes 26, 72, 137, 155, 161 and accompanying text.
272. See Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012 (2016); Donald Earl 
Childress III, Escaping Federal Law in Transnational Cases: The Brave New World of 
Transnational Litigation, 93 N.C. L. REV. 995, 1001 (2015) (noting “domestic and foreign courts 
compete through domestic and foreign law, both substantive and procedural, to regulate 
transnational activities as part of a transnational law market”); see also supra note 27 and 
accompanying text. 
273. See Cross, supra note 256, at 149.
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to federal courts and thereby facilitating foreign relations.274 While this 
theory originally developed in the context of federal habeas corpus 
actions,275 it remains relevant in a world that is increasingly focused on 
promoting and protecting international trade.276
Although this second theory appears somewhat similar to the first, the 
foreign relations rationale focuses on the difficulties that can and do arise 
when a foreign country believes its citizens and corporations are being 
mistreated in U.S. courts.277 This theory is particularly relevant to cases 
involving commercial trusts, which can involve business that operate on 
a national and international basis.278 Furthermore, many commercial 
trusts involve industries—such as capital markets, pensions and 
international insurance and reinsurance—that carry significant public 
policy implications, which may increase foreign states’ concerns about 
fair and equitable treatment in U.S. courts.279 If a foreign nation does not 
feel that it and its citizens are being respected in U.S. courts, that country 
may take action, diplomatically280 or statutorily.281
                                                                                                                     
274. See id.; Michael G. Collins, Comment, The Diversity Theory of the Alien Tort Statute,
42 VA. J. INT’L L. 649, 681–85 (2002); Oh, supra note 4, at 437 (noting alienage jurisdiction 
focuses on “preserving foreign relations; the necessity of guarding against xenophobic sentiments, 
whether actual or perceived; and the values of facilitating trade” (footnotes omitted)).
275. See Collins, supra note 274, at 681–85. 
276. The nature and limits of prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction have become 
increasingly problematic over the last few decades. 
277. See supra notes 269–70.
278. See Cross, supra note 256, at 151; see also supra notes 26, 72, 137, 155, 159–64 and 
accompanying text.
279. See supra Subsection I.B.2.
280. For example, in the 1970s and 1980s, a number of U.S. courts sought to extend the 
extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws, leading to a variety of foreign relations concerns, as 
expressed in diplomatic notes from the United Kingdom and Germany. See GARY B. BORN &
PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS (5th ed. 2011)
(discussing the Laker Airways cases); Stephen D. Piraino, Note, A Prescription for Excess: Using 
Prescriptive Comity to Limit the Extraterritorial Reach of the Sherman Act, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1099, 1120–21 (2012). Indeed, Germany insisted on a special international accord to harmonize 
its efforts to address international trade violations and put the issue to rest. See Antitrust Accord, 
U.S-Germany, June 23, 1976, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/international-
antitrust-and-consumer-protection-cooperation-agreements/agree_germany.pdf. These issues 
continue to be raised. See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) 
(discussing the extraterritorial reach of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO)); Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 167–68 (2004) (discussing 
amicus briefs from Canada, Germany and Japan regarding the extraterritorial reach of the 
Sherman Act).
281. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 
YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 152 (2009) (discussing a variety of blocking statutes, including the 
Protection of Trading Interest Act 1980 (U.K.), which the United Kingdom adopted in response 
to the Laker Airways cases).
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A third theory posits that diversity jurisdiction was founded on the 
need to alleviate concerns that foreign and out-of-state commercial 
actors, particularly creditors, will be disadvantaged in state court.282
Some commentators distinguish this theory from the two preceding ones 
on the grounds that this proposition focuses on matters relating to the 
application of substantive state laws rather than concerns about emotion 
or prejudice on the part of the decision-maker.283
This third theory also augurs in favor of facilitating diversity 
jurisdiction in cases involving commercial trusts. Commercial trusts 
often include choice of law provisions284 that could create problems for 
the parties if state court judges fail to respect those provisions or interpret 
them properly.285 This concern may be particularly pronounced in cross-
border cases governed by foreign law.286
A fourth rationale supporting diversity jurisdiction involves the real 
or perceived superiority of the federal bench.287 While critics of diversity 
jurisdiction have claimed that few differences actually exist between state 
and federal courts, a number of empirical studies have suggested that the 
choice of forum can be outcome determinative.288 Even if the empirical 
research on this issue is flawed, it is widely accepted that “many 
procedures, regardless of the motives behind their adoption, inevitably 
influence who brings suits, the value of settlement, and often the results 
at trial or by forced termination before trial.”289 Thus, the perception of 
the federal courts as being superior to state courts in terms of both 
                                                                                                                     
282. See Bassett, supra note 3, at 133; Cross, supra note 256, at 151.
283. See Bassett, supra note 3, at 132–33; Rush, supra note 262, at 124 (defining bias as “a 
shared ‘ideology’ based on a shared geography between a litigant and his or her home state 
judge”).
284. The flexibility of trust law generally supports the use of choice of law provisions, which 
could lead to a disconnect between the place where the dispute is heard and the law governing the 
dispute. See also infra Subsection III.B.3. Federal courts are more familiar with matters governed 
by foreign substantive law and thus may be more likely to respect choice of law provisions. See 
Matthew J. Wilson, Demystifying the Determination of Foreign Law in U.S. Courts: Opening the 
Door to a Greater Global Understanding, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887, 892–93, 97 (2011). 
285. Commentators have noted that many judges ignore choice of law provisions so as to 
rely on local law. See Louise Ellen Teitz, Determining and Applying Foreign Law: The Increasing 
Need for Cross-Border Cooperation, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1081, 1091 (2013). 
286. See id. at 1081. The internal affairs of trusts doing business in foreign jurisdictions are 
typically governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the trust was formed. See Rutledge & 
Habbart, supra note 15, at 1095.
287. See Cross, supra note 256, at 154; see also Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1120–21 (1977) [hereinafter Neuborne, Myth]; Burt Neuborne, Parity 
Revisited: The Uses of a Judicial Forum of Excellence, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 797, 799 (1995).
288. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 607; Cross, supra note 256, at 154. But see 
Bassett, supra note 3, at 140–41 (challenging the legitimacy of empirical studies in this area).
289. See Subrin, supra note 164, at 2152.
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procedure and judicial independence will influence party behavior 
regardless of whether there is any ascertainable difference in outcome.290
At this point, commercial actors organizing ventures as commercial 
trusts have few means of avoiding the rule in Americold other than to exit 
the U.S. judicial system entirely through arbitration, choice of law or 
choice of forum provisions, or decisions relating to the place and type of 
business organization.291 While it is unclear whether the virtual 
elimination of diversity jurisdiction will drive parties to adopt one or 
more of these defensive mechanisms, it is a possibility that must be 
considered. Furthermore, the significance of commercial trusts to the 
U.S. economy suggests that this is not an issue that Congress should take 
lightly.292
The fifth and final justification for diversity jurisdiction involves the 
use of the federal judicial system to promote “harmony and proper 
intercourse among the States.”293 This principle can be explained in both 
                                                                                                                     
290. See Neuborne, Myth, supra note 287, at 1120–21; Rush, supra note 262, at 159–60.
Judicial independence is often tied to the life tenure of the federal bench. The situation is quite 
different in state courts. At this point, 
twenty-two states use contested judicial elections to select their judges, with 
seven states holding partisan elections and fifteen using non-partisan elections,
i.e., elections in which the party affiliation of the candidates is not shown on the 
ballot. Thirteen states use some form of the Missouri Plan, named for the state 
that first adopted this form of “merit” selection. The remaining fifteen states 
employ some variation of the federal model, mixing executive appointment with 
some form of legislative confirmation. And the experiment continues “in 2011,
[with] 26 states consider[ing] legislation to change or replace their judicial merit 
selection systems.”
Scott W. Gaylord, Unconventional Wisdom: The Roberts’ Court’s Proper Support of Judicial 
Elections, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1521, 1522 (citation omitted) (noting “[c]onventional wisdom” 
that “the experiment with judicial elections has failed”). The United States appears to be the only 
jurisdiction in the world to select its judges through popular election. The only other countries to 
include an electoral element to judicial selection are Switzerland, which appoints judges through 
election by the Federal Assembly, and Japan, which allows judges to be removed from the bench 
through a referendum. See JAPAN CONST., arts. 78–79, http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/
itdb_english.nsf/html/statics/english/constitution_e.htm; Benjamin Suter, Appointment, 
Discipline and Removal of Judges: A Comparison of the Swiss and New Zealand Judiciaries, 46
VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 267, 280 (2015); Sher Watts Spooner, Why Does America Elect 
Judges, Anyway?, DAILY KOS (Mar. 6, 2016), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2016/3/6/
1489191/-Why-does-America-elect-judges-anyway.
291. See Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012 (2016); see also infra
notes 300–57 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 26, 72, 137, 155, 161 and accompanying text.
293. Cross, supra note 256 at 157 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 235 (James Madison) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1990)); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 445–46 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1990). But see Bassett, supra note 3, at 119 (claiming that diversity 
jurisdiction actually hinders national harmony by promoting regional biases).
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commercial terms (as illustrated by the work of Professor Akhil Amar) 
and social terms (as demonstrated by the writing of Professor Jack 
Balkin).294 Judge Diane Wood has echoed these sentiments, noting that 
“diversity jurisdiction has existed as one tool for assuring a national 
approach to national problems that happen to be governed by state 
law.”295 Thus, diversity jurisdiction can be conceived of as an important 
means of “prevent[ing] state boundaries from impeding judicial efforts to 
dispose of controversies in the most fair and efficient manner 
possible.”296
Although commercial trusts are largely governed by state law (a 
feature that is shared by corporations), they operate on a national basis 
and play a large and increasing role in both the national and international 
economies.297 As such, there appears to be good reason for federal courts 
to have jurisdiction over disputes involving commercial trusts, as is the 
case with disputes involving corporations.298
As the preceding discussion shows, all of the theories used to justify 
diversity jurisdiction support extending the rule to include commercial 
trust disputes. While this analysis may be sufficient to convince some 
legislators to override Americold, Congress need not rely on theoretical 
concerns.299 Instead, there are a number of highly persuasive practical 
arguments in favor of statutory reform, as discussed in the next
Subsection.
B. Practical Issues
Traditionally, arguments against diversity jurisdiction have focused 
on the malleability of the device and its lack of jurisprudential 
cohesiveness, which is said to result in improper judicial and corporate 
strategizing.300 These features have also made diversity jurisdiction 
appear “dubious to general theorists and those interested in systemic 
judicial efficiency.”301 However, trial lawyers and corporate counsel have 
consistently defended the mechanism as “an exceptionally useful tactical 
                                                                                                                     
294. See AKHIL AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 108 (2005); Jack M. 
Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2010); Cross, supra note 256, at 170.
295. Wood, supra note 17, at 605.
296. Cross, supra note 256, at 186.
297. See Paul E. Lund, Federally Chartered Corporations and Federal Jurisdiction, 36 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 317, 320 (2009) (noting “the majority of American corporations are chartered under 
state law”); Rutledge & Habbart, supra note 15, at 1055; see also supra notes 26, 72, 137, 155, 
161 and accompanying text. 
298. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012).
299. See Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012 (2016).
300. See Purcell, supra note 3, at 1839.
301. Id.
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tool” that provides them with a much-desired federal forum.302 As a 
result, the contemporary debate about diversity jurisdiction often focuses 
more on pragmatic rather than theoretical concerns.303 Indeed, Professor 
Purcell has noted that over the last few years, the discussion about 
jurisdiction has become
more closely intertwined not just with issues of institutional 
structure and federal-state relations but also with issues of 
private economic conflict and public social policy. More 
particularly, reform efforts [have become] increasingly 
intertwined with what might be called “litigation-generated” 
issues, that is, issues that arose not from traditional structural 
or institutional conflicts but from pervasive and socially 
resonant patterns of litigation, especially the rapidly 
escalating number of cases that pitted national corporations 
against a wide variety of claimants—suppliers, customers, 
employees, and adversely affected third parties.304
The most recent example of this new approach to jurisdictional 
analysis can be seen in the debates involving the Class Action Fairness 
Act (CAFA), which addressed “practical problems that were both 
weighty and pressing.”305 Though CAFA resembled existing models of 
jurisdictional reform in some regards, the statute was unusual in the way 
it increased, rather than restricted, diversity jurisdiction and “opened new 
vistas for the expanded and highly flexible use of [diversity] jurisdiction 
by exploiting its two most potentially powerful instrumental 
characteristics: its nearly illimitable plasticity and its precise targeting 
capability.”306 Although CAFA is not the only federal statute to embrace 
the concept of minimum (rather than complete) diversity,307 CAFA is said 
to have “strengthened the legitimacy of such a potentially vast and pliable 
protective jurisdiction with its original constitutional justification,” 
thereby bringing practical considerations back into line with legal 
theory.308
                                                                                                                     
302. Id. at 1838. 
303. See id. at 1825.
304. Id. at 1828.
305. See id. at 1851.
306. Id. at 1857.
307. The same technique was used in matters involving interpleader and multiparty, 
multiforum matters. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335(a)(1), 1369 (2012); Purcell, supra note 3, at 1856. 
Some commentators have called for the adoption of minimal diversity in all cases. See Miller,
supra note 244, at 269.
308. Purcell, supra note 3, at 1859; see also Cross, supra note 256, at 146; Miller, supra note 
244, at 279. But see Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical 
Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1523–24 (2008) (noting constitutional 
arguments against CAFA); C. Douglas Floyd, The Inadequacy of the Interstate Commerce 
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The preceding suggests that Congress needs to evaluate the practical 
implications of Americold when considering whether and to what extent 
a legislative response is appropriate.309 Among the prospects that 
Congress must consider are the likelihood that the rule from Americold 
will cause parties to exit the U.S. judicial system through arbitration 
agreements or through forum selection clauses, choice of law provisions 
or the place of organization.310 Alternatively, parties could reject 
commercial trusts in favor of other types of business associations, most 
notably corporations. Each of these possibilities are analyzed in the 
following Subsections.
1. Exit Through Arbitration
One of the most popular and effective ways for parties to avoid an 
unwelcome judicial forum is through arbitration. This route may be 
particularly attractive to U.S. parties, given the strong pro-arbitration 
policy reflected in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and most state 
arbitration statutes.311
Interestingly, there has never been a better time for parties to seek 
arbitration of commercial trust disputes.312 Not only have five states 
(Arizona, Florida, Missouri, New Hampshire, and South Dakota) recently 
enacted statutes specifically providing for the enforcement of arbitration 
                                                                                                                     
Justification for the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 55 EMORY L.J. 487 (2006); Floyd, supra 
note 244, at 613. Though the term is not well defined, 
[t]he concept of protective jurisdiction tends to arise in situations in which 
Congress has authorized a federal forum, the accepted minimum requirements 
for a case to arise under federal law are not met, and no other basis for federal 
jurisdiction can be found under article III of the Constitution. Since Congress has 
necessarily concluded in such instances that a federal forum is desired in order 
to promote some federal interest, the federal jurisdiction is characterized as 
“protective” of that interest.
Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The Protective Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 30 UCLA L.
REV. 542, 546–47 (1983).
309. See Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012 (2016). 
310. See id. at 1016–17.
311. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307 (2012); Nitro-Lift Tech., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 501 
(2012); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012); Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). It is unclear whether and to what extent the FAA preempts state 
arbitration statutes in trust-related disputes. See David Horton, Donative Trusts and the United 
States Federal Arbitration Act, in ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 77, at 203, 203–27 (focusing on non-commercial trusts but 
discussing factors that may be persuasive in the commercial context).
312. See S.I. Strong, The Future of Trust Arbitration: Quo Vadis? in ARBITRATION OF TRUST 
DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 77, at 531, 546.
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provisions in trust instruments,313 but some types of commercial trust 
disputes are statutorily required to be resolved through arbitration.314
Support for trust arbitration has also been seen in judicial quarters, with 
a number of U.S. courts, most notably the Supreme Court of Texas, 
judicially recognizing the arbitrability of internal trust disputes even in 
cases without a specific statute on trust arbitration.315
Trust arbitration has spread to other countries as well. Not only have 
key offshore jurisdictions like Guernsey and the Bahamas explicitly 
adopted legislation allowing for the arbitration of trust disputes, but 
countries such as Switzerland have addressed the matter indirectly 
through their conflict of laws provisions.316
As these examples suggest, the field of trust arbitration is expanding 
rapidly.317 However, these developments do not exist in a vacuum. 
                                                                                                                     
313. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205 (2016), applied in Jones v. Fink, 2011 WL 
601598 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011); FLA. STAT. § 731.401 (2016); MO. REV. STAT. § 456.2-205 (2016); 
N.H. REV. STAT. § 564-B:1-111A (2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1-54 (2016); Lee-ford Tritt, 
Legislative Approaches to Trust Arbitration in the United States, in ARBITRATION OF TRUST 
DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 77, at 150, 159–71. Other 
state statutes appear to permit the arbitration of trust disputes, although they have not yet been 
tested. See Strong, supra note 79, at 1188–92.
314. See 29 U.S.C. § 1401 (2012) (referring to certain types of multiemployer pension 
trusts); ILGWU Nat’l Ret. Fund v. Meredith Gray, Inc., 94 Fed. App’x 850, 852 (2d Cir. 2003); 
Teamsters-Emp’rs Local 945 Pension Fund v. Waste Mgmt. N.J., Inc., No. 11-902 (FSH), 2011 
WL 2173854, at *2 (D.N.J. 2011); S.I. Strong, Institutional Approaches to Trust Arbitration: 
Comparing the AAA, ACTEC, ICC, and DIS Trust Arbitration Regimes, in ARBITRATION OF TRUST 
DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 77, at 99, 137; INT’L FOUND.
OF EMP. BENEFIT PLANS, IMPARTIAL UMPIRE RULES FOR ARBITRATION OF IMPASSES BETWEEN 
TRUSTEES OF JOINT EMPLOYEE BENEFIT TRUST FUNDS (effective Jan. 1, 1988),
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Impartial%20Umpire%20Rules%20for%20Arbitration%2
0of%20Impasses%20Between%20Trustees%20of%20Joint%20Employee%20Benefit%20Trust
%20Funds.pdf; INT’L FOUND. OF EMP. BENEFIT PLANS, MULTI-EMPLOYER PENSION PLAN 
ARBITRATION RULES FOR WITHDRAWAL LIABILITY DISPUTES (rev’d effective Sept. 1, 1986),
http://www.lawmemo.com/arb/res/aaa-meppa.htm.
315. See Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 842 (Tex. 2013); see also Mary F. Radford, Trust 
Arbitration in the United States Courts, in ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 77, at 175, 176–96 (discussing numerous state and federal 
cases); Strong, supra note 79, at 1159–1248 (considering recent developments in the field of 
international commercial arbitration).
316. See Private International Law Statute, chs. 9a, 12 (Switz.); Trustee Act of 1925, ch. 19,
pt. II, § 15(f) (Guernsey); Trustee (Amendment) Act 2011 § 18(2) (Bah.); Trusts (Guernsey) Law 
2007 pt. II, § 63(1)(a) (Guernsey 2008); David Brownbill, Arbitration of Trust Disputes Under 
the Bahamas Trustee Act 1998, in ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 77, at 313; Paul Buckle, Trust Arbitration in Guernsey, in
ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 77,
at 289; Strong, supra note 77, at 383, 392; Strong, supra note 79, at 1193–95.
317. A full discussion of the various issues is beyond the scope of the current Article, 
although further reading is available. See ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL 
49
Strong: Congress and Commercial Trusts: Dealing with Diversity Jurisdicti
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
1070 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
Indeed, similar initiatives are currently being considered in the corporate 
context.318 The most important development arose in 2009, when the 
German Federal Court of Justice declared shareholder disputes 
arbitrable,319 but other countries have adopted analogous measures, 
leading a number of major multinational corporations, most notably 
Royal Dutch Shell, to adopt arbitration provisions in their corporate 
documents.320 While the United States does not appear to be as far along 
as these jurisdictions, a number of U.S. scholars have considered the 
relationship between the FAA and arbitration provisions in corporate 
bylaws and charters.321
These developments suggest an increasingly positive global 
perspective on the arbitration of internal trust disputes, including those 
involving commercial trusts.322 However, some problems do exist. 
Perhaps the most disquieting involves the Security and Exchange 
Commission’s (SEC) unwritten but well-known policy of refusing to 
                                                                                                                     
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 77, passim; S.I. Strong, Mandatory Arbitration of Internal 
Trust Disputes: Improving Arbitrability and Enforceability Through Proper Procedural Choices,
28 ARB. INT’L 591, 593 (2012); Strong, supra note 79, at 1157.
318. See Olivier Caprasse, Objective Arbitrability of Corporate Disputes—Belgium and 
France, in ONDERNEMING EN ADR 79, 79–99 (C.J.M. Klaassen et al. eds., 2011); Gerard Meijer 
& Josefina Guzman, The International Recognition of an Arbitration Clause in the Articles of 
Association of a Company, in ONDERNEMING EN ADR, supra, at 117, 117–51; Strong, supra note 
317, at 592.
319. See ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] [Federal 
Court of Justice] Apr. 6, 2009, II ZR 255/08 (Ger.), http://www.kluwerarbitration.com/
CommonUI/document.aspx?id=kli-ka-0945006; Christian Borris, Arbitrability of Corporate Law 
Disputes in Germany, in ONDERNEMING EN ADR, supra note 318, at 55, 56. This decision led the 
German Arbitral Institution (DIS) to adopt a special set of arbitral rules dedicated to the resolution 
of internal shareholder disputes, including those relating to corporate governance. See DIS
SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CORPORATE LAW DISPUTES § 1.1 (2009), http://www.dis-
arb.de/download/DIS_SRCoLD_%202009_Download.pdf. These rules could easily be adapted 
for use in internal trust disputes. See Strong, supra note 314, at 108–36; Strong, supra note 317,
at 637–49.
320. Royal Dutch Shell is an Anglo-Dutch company incorporated in the United Kingdom 
and headquartered in the Netherlands. The company’s articles of association include an arbitration 
agreement that constitutes “an express submission to arbitration by each shareholder, the 
company, its directors and professional service providers.” ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION OF ROYAL 
DUTCH SHELL PLC art. 138(A), (F) (adopted May, 18 2010), http://www.shell.com/media/news-
and-media-releases/2012/cove-energy-02052012/_jcr_content/par/textimage.stream/144118062
9555/ce14642c7238f77a5c65f42f40313ded1809ceed6a3b629b527465ad63a7d00d/articles-of-
association-shell.pdf; see also infra note 339 (discussing other provisions).
321. See Claudia H. Allen, Bylaws Mandating Arbitration of Stockholder Disputes?, 39 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 751, 773–75 (2015); Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of 
Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO L.J. 583, 600–03 (2016).
322. See Kantor, supra note 98, at 45 (noting desirability of arbitration of some types of 
commercial trust disputes); Strong, supra note 312, at 540; Strong, supra note 79, at 1177–79 
(noting commercial trusts are not donative in nature).
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provide accelerated registration for public offerings of equity securities 
in cases where shareholder disputes are subject to a pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement.323 Although the scope of this rule is somewhat 
unclear (for example, it is not known whether bonds and other debt 
offerings are covered under the current policy),324 the SEC’s ban on 
arbitration would clearly affect commercial trusts that are or might be 
publicly traded at some point in the future.325 While industry groups have 
occasionally sought to persuade the SEC to change its approach, those 
efforts have thus far been unsuccessful.326
Arbitration of commercial trust disputes could also experience 
difficulties as a matter of public policy. While U.S. courts have held that 
arbitration is appropriate in a number of areas of public concern,327
opponents to arbitration of non-commercial trusts have asserted various 
types of policy arguments, including those claiming exclusive 
jurisdiction of probate or chancery courts over trust-related disputes and 
those involving the application of various mandatory rules of law, such 
as the law of succession.328 Although more research needs to be 
conducted, it is possible that some of these objections could be applicable 
to disputes involving commercial trusts.329 Furthermore, some types of 
commercial trusts might be subject to their own unique policy concerns. 
For example, the public nature of regulatory compliance trusts could 
require disputes to be resolved in an entirely transparent (i.e., public) 
manner.330
                                                                                                                     
323. See Kantor, supra note 98, at 36; Carl W. Schneider, Arbitration Provisions in 
Corporate Governance Documents, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (2012), 
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/04/27/arbitration-provisions-in-corporate-governance-
documents/. Other difficulties exist, as in cases involving special purpose vehicles, which can 
give rise to issues of consent, and situations involving non-exclusive choice of forum. See Kantor, 
supra note 98, at 31–43. 
324. See Kantor, supra note 98, at 37. Although the SEC policy does not apply to private 
bond placements, parties often contemplate the possible resale of private bonds on the public 
market, which often precludes the inclusion of an arbitration provision in the original documents. 
See id.
325. See id.; see also supra note 147 and accompanying text (noting the number of publicly 
traded REITs in August 2016). 
326. See Kantor, supra note 98, at 37 (noting no judicial challenges have yet been brought 
to determine the propriety of the policy or its scope).
327. Arbitration has been considered appropriate in such policy-laden fields as antitrust and 
international insurance and reinsurance law. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985); Strong, supra note 161, at 287–88, 301.
328. See Strong, supra note 79, at 1200 n.204, 1234–35. 
329. For example, even a commercial trust could run into difficulties regarding the law of 
succession. See Regions Bank v. Britt, No. 4:09CV61TSL-LRA, 2009 WL 3766490, at *2 & n.2 
(S.D. Miss. Nov. 10, 2009).
330. See supra notes 157–62 and accompanying text.
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Arbitration therefore appears to provide parties with a possible means 
of relief from the rule in Americold, although this option is not without 
its difficulties.331 However, there are other ways for a party to evade an 
undesirable judicial forum, as discussed in the following Subsection.
2. Exit Through Forum Selection Clauses, Choice of Law Provisions,
and Place of Organization
Another way for parties to avoid a particular judicial forum is through 
a forum selection clause.332 These types of provisions are widely 
recognized in U.S. courts, albeit with some limitations.333 For example, 
parties cannot use a forum selection provision to create jurisdiction where 
none would otherwise exist.334 As a result, parties cannot use a forum 
selection clause to choose a U.S. federal court if subject matter 
jurisdiction does not exist as a matter of federal or constitutional law.335
In the case of commercial trusts, parties might be inclined to use a 
forum selection provision to choose a U.S. state or foreign court with 
particular expertise in these types of disputes.336 However, that technique 
                                                                                                                     
331. See Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1016–17 (2016). 
332. Interestingly, forum selection provisions are routinely used in contracts between
companies but are seldom found in the founding documents of publicly traded corporations. See 
Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Clauses: An 
Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333, 336–37 (2012). The incidence of forum selection 
provisions in an entity’s organic documents is higher for limited liability companies and limited 
liability partnerships than for corporations. See id. at 357. At this point, it is unclear which model 
is more applicable to commercial trusts because the issue may turn on whether and to what extent 
commercial trusts experience the same types of difficulties that corporations have with respect to 
the time and manner of adoption of the forum selection clause. See id. at 390. Delaware recently 
adopted a law allowing exclusive forum selection provisions for certain types of corporations, 
which should lead to an increase in the use of such provisions. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 
(2016); Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).
333. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Distr. Ct., 134 S. Ct. 568, 579, 581 (2013) (noting 
strong federal policy in favor of enforcing forum selection provisions in the interstate context);
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972) (holding forum selection provisions are 
enforceable unless unreasonable under the circumstances); Erin Ann O’Hara, The Jurisprudence 
and Politics of Forum-Selection Clauses, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 301, 301 (2002) (suggesting forum 
selection clauses are most robustly enforced in international commercial cases). The United States 
has signed the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (COCA), although ratification has not 
yet occurred. See Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294, 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98.
334. See Stephen E. Sachs, The Forum Selection Defense, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1, 17–18 (2014).
335. See id. 
336. For example, Delaware or Massachusetts might be a favored location, given those 
states’ expertise in corporate law and statutory trusts. The English Commercial Court also has an 
excellent reputation in complex commercial matters. Other popular offshore jurisdictions include 
Switzerland, Guernsey, Singapore, and the Cayman Islands. 
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might require parties to make other procedural choices to allow the court 
in question to exercise jurisdiction over the dispute.337 For example, some 
courts will hear any dispute governed by the law of that jurisdiction, 
regardless of whether any other connections exist between that 
jurisdiction and the parties or the dispute.338 However, parties may have 
to choose to have the dispute governed by the law of the preferred forum 
if they have no other connections to that jurisdiction.339
Other courts may require a more substantive connection between the 
dispute and the jurisdiction. Thus, it may be necessary for a commercial 
trust to be registered or organized under a particular state law or have its 
primary place of business in a particular location if the parties want the 
courts in that jurisdiction to hear a dispute arising out of the trust.340 This 
approach can be interpreted as an implicit requirement that the parties 
choose the law of the forum, since parties who choose to do business in 
or organize themselves under a particular jurisdiction’s laws typically 
make themselves subject to that law.341
This is not to say that a choice of forum provision necessarily requires 
the parties to choose that jurisdiction’s substantive law to apply to the 
merits of the dispute. The law of the forum and the law governing the 
dispute do not always have to be the same.342 However, sophisticated 
commercial actors recognize that courts do not always apply foreign law 
correctly or readily, either in the interstate or the international context.343
                                                                                                                     
337. For example, some states require certain types of disputes to be heard in their courts or
under their laws. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 272.001(b) (West 2016). 
338. For example, English courts will typically exercise jurisdiction over any dispute 
governed by English law, even if the parties and the dispute have no other connection to England. 
See ADRIAN BRIGGS, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ENGLISH COURTS 10 (2016). New York has 
adopted similar provisions in cases over a certain minimum amount. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW
§§ 5-1401 to 5-1402 (McKinney 2016); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to 
New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held 
Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1484–85 (2009).
339. Royal Dutch Shell has adopted this type of choice of forum/choice of law provision to 
address situations where its arbitration provision does not apply. See ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION
OF ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC, supra note 320; see also supra note 320 and accompanying text 
(discussing the relevant arbitration agreement). 
340. The place where a business entity is organized often acts as an implicit choice of forum 
provision. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 338, at 1476; Grundfest, supra note 332, at 350–
51. 
341. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An 
Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1978 (2006). 
342. See Wilson, supra note 284, at 888, 890. For an interesting analysis of whether and to 
what extent substantive legal issues should be decided in the “home” forum of the relevant legal 
principle, see Verity Winship, Aligning Law and Forum: The Home Court Advantage, 81 TENN.
L. REV. 1 (2013).
343. See Thomas O. Main, The Word Commons and Foreign Laws, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
219, 220–21 (2013); Wilson, supra note 284, at 890–91.
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Indeed, the desire to ensure proper application of choice of law provisions 
is one of the reasons why parties adopt arbitration rather than litigation in 
complex multijurisdictional actions.344
Although choice of forum and choice of law provisions may initially 
appear to be less problematic than arbitration,345 these types of 
mechanisms experience a number of the same difficulties that are seen in
arbitration. For example, choice of forum and choice of law provisions 
may trigger public policy concerns about having a nationally or 
regionally important dispute decided by someone other than a U.S. state 
or federal judge.346 As the recent financial crisis shows, transparency and 
accountability are critical to the proper protection of individuals and 
institutions,347 and policymakers may be loath to allow various types of 
public concerns to be heard outside the relevant jurisdiction. The 
international legal and business communities have also enunciated 
concerns about whether and to what extent offshore trusts are being used 
to conceal assets from judgment or award creditors.348
These concerns could lead judiciaries or legislatures to refuse to 
enforce certain types of forum selection provisions.349 They also support 
the argument that these types of matters should be heard in federal rather 
than state court. Furthermore, some facially acceptable solutions—such 
                                                                                                                     
344. Arbitrators tend to comply with choice of law provisions more readily than judges and 
are often chosen for their expertise in that law. Cf. Stefan Michael Kröll, The “Arbitrability” of 
Disputes Arising from Commercial Representation, in ARBITRABILITY: INTERNATIONAL &
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ¶ 16-57, at 339, ¶ 16-65, at 342 (Loukas A. Mistelis & Stavros L. 
Brekoulakis eds., 2009). 
345. See supra notes 323–26 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC policy on 
arbitration).
346. See Verdier, supra note 281, at 119–20, 146 (noting problems associated with regulation 
of transnational disputes).
347. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS 
IN THE UNITED STATES xix, xxii (2011), http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/fcic/201103
10173538/http://www.fcic.gov/report; Arthur, supra note 141, at 590.
348. Tim Penny QC has stated: “Offshore trusts are frequently used. . . . They will often 
engage bona fide trustees, a bona fide offshore structure with a bona fide trust and arrange matters 
so that they have the power to tell the trustees what to do.” BURFORD BAROMETER, 2016 JUDGMENT 
ENFORCEMENT SURVEY 4 (2016), http://www.burfordcapital.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/
06/Burford_WhitePaper_US_Final_Web.pdf (conducting an empirical study regarding the 
enforcement rates of court judgments and arbitral awards and noting that many judgments and 
awards are not complied with at their full value); see also id. (“Some of the most bedeviling 
enforcement challenges comes [sic] in cases in which a judgment debtor . . . has taken significant 
steps to conceal assets by moving them into offshore jurisdictions, where they are hard to identify, 
let alone recover.”).
349. See O’Hara, supra note 333, at 309.
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as the use of a foreign location as the trust’s place of registration—may 
not resolve all of the problems created by Americold.350
The prospect of exit through organization in a foreign country may be 
particularly troubling to Congress, since the flight to offshore 
jurisdictions could have a significant financial effect on local and national 
economies. Trust law is a very lucrative and competitive field, and 
commentators have already noted “strong evidence of a national market 
for trust funds that is responsive to the interplay between state trust law 
and federal tax law.”351 Specialists have already voiced concerns about 
losing transactional and dispute-related business to other jurisdictions, 
leading state legislatures to become increasingly responsive to the 
concerns of the trust law industry.352 International and interstate 
competition also gives rise to regulatory concerns, given the potential for 
a race to the bottom.353
3. Exit Through Choice of Business Form
Perhaps the most effective way for parties to avoid the effects of 
Americold is by choosing to operate as a corporation rather than a 
commercial trust. Numerous studies exist describing how various 
differences between trusts and corporations can affect the decision to use 
one business form over another,354 and it appears likely that questions 
relating to diversity jurisdiction will soon be factored into these types of 
                                                                                                                     
350. For example, establishing a commercial trust in a foreign country does not ensure a 
federal forum if suit is brought in the United States. See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying 
text.
351. Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 109, at 362; see also Stewart E. Sterk, Asset 
Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1037–38, 1055–
56 (2000) (noting competition among the states for trust business); Eisenberg & Miller, supra 
note 338, at 1481 (noting competition for legal business outside the trust context).
352. Trust lawyers and commercial lawyers have both enunciated significant concerns about 
the prospects of losing business to jurisdictions with more welcoming laws, and anecdotal 
information suggests that practitioners are actively lobbying for legislation that facilitates
commercial trusts in their jurisdictions so as to remain competitive. See Horton, supra note 9, at 
1070; Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 40 (discussing regulatory competition in corporate, securities, 
bankruptcy, environmental, tax, secured transactions, welfare, and antitrust law); Sitkoff & 
Schanzenbach, supra note 109, at 359–64.
353. See Sterk, supra note 351, at 1037–38, 1055–57.
354. See, e.g., Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Capital Market Efficiency,
28 J. CORP. L. 565, 570–81 (2003) (comparing trusts and publicly-traded corporations to 
determine the effect of capital market efficiency); A. Joseph Warburton, Trusts Versus 
Corporations: An Empirical Analysis of Competing Organizational Forms, 36 J. CORP. L. 183, 
184–87, 219–20 (2010) (focusing on issues involving regulation of trusts and corporations, 
particularly with respect to agency conflict and decisional flexibility). Empirical studies also exist 
with respect to competition between different states for particular types of trust-related business. 
See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 109, at 362.
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strategic analyses. While some people may not believe that a Supreme 
Court decision about diversity jurisdiction will have a significant effect 
on commercial decision-making, recent research by Professors Richard 
Thaler and Cass Sunstein demonstrates how even small “nudges” can 
influence individual and institutional behavior.355 The question therefore 
is whether Congress wishes to increase the incentives in favor of the 
corporate form by allowing Americold to stand.
IV. POSSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES TO AMERICOLD
As important as the Supreme Court is in deciding matters relating to 
diversity jurisdiction, the Court does not have the final word on this 
issue.356 In fact, the Court itself suggested in Americold that Congress 
could and should intervene if it believes commercial trusts should be 
given increased access to federal courts.357
At this point, Congress appears to have two possible responses to 
Americold. First, Congress could create a statutory exception to the rule 
requiring complete diversity, something it has done on three previous 
occasions.358 Second, Congress could create a statutory definition of the 
citizenship of a business trust, similar to that used for corporations in 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).359 Both approaches seem viable, although they 
would lead to slightly different results.  
A. Creation of a Statutory Exception to the Rule Requiring 
Complete Diversity
The first way that Congress could override Americold is through a 
statutory exception to the rule requiring complete diversity.360 This 
approach would likely be relatively easy to implement, which is 
important given the wide range of commercial trusts in existence and the 
potential difficulty in providing a single definition for citizenship that 
encompasses all of the types of commercial trusts that are currently 
possible.361 This type of response would also pass constitutional muster, 
since the Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he complete diversity 
requirement is not mandated by the Constitution.”362
                                                                                                                     
355. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 252 (2008).
356. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 34, at 1317, 1382.
357. See Americold Realty Trust v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1017 (2016).
358. See 13E WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3605, at 223.
359. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012).
360. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1017.
361. See supra Subsection I.B.2 (discussing types of commercial trusts).
362. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005) (citing State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967)).
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Congress has adopted a rule of minimal diversity in three different 
statutes:363 the Interpleader Act;364 the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial 
Jurisdiction Act (known as the MMTJA or the mass-disaster act);365 and
CAFA.366 Each of these enactments differs slightly in both form and 
intent. For example, the Interpleader Act was enacted in 1936 in response 
to the Supreme Court decision in New York Life Insurance Co. v. 
Dunlevy367 and authorized national service of process in federal 
interpleader actions involving claimants who came from different 
states.368
The Interpleader Act stood as a jurisdictional anomaly until 2002, 
when the MMTJA was adopted to address injuries arising out of a single 
mass disaster.369 The MMTJA acts by conferring original jurisdiction on
the federal courts in any civil case involving minimal 
diversity between adverse parties and involving a single 
accident at a discrete location where at least seventy-five 
persons died and either (a) the accident occurred in a state or 
other location different from that of defendant’s residence, 
(b) “any two defendants reside in different States,” or (c) 
“substantial parts of the accident took place in different 
States.”370
CAFA, the third and thus far final statute in this series, was enacted in 
2005 to “restore the intent of the framers of the United States Constitution 
by providing for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national 
importance under diversity jurisdiction.”371 CAFA did so by giving 
federal courts jurisdiction over any class action with minimal diversity 
                                                                                                                     
363. Minimal diversity means that at least one plaintiff and one defendant are diverse, as 
opposed to complete diversity, which requires all plaintiffs and defendants to be diverse.
364. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 931 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1335 
(2012)); see also State Farm, 386 U.S. at 531 (noting “in a variety of contexts this Court and the 
lower courts have concluded that Article III poses no obstacle to the legislative extension of 
federal jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so long as any two adverse parties are not co-citizens”); 
Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 308, at 549 (noting the Interpleader Act is and was largely 
uncontroversial). 
365. Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11020, 116 Stat. 1826 (2002) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1369 (2012)); see also Floyd, supra note 244, at 624–28.
366. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), 1453 (2012); see also 13E WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13,
§ 3605, at 229; Wood, supra note 17, at 602–03. 
367. 241 U.S. 518 (1916). 
368. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 308, at 549 n.42.
369. See 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a), (c)(4).
370. Miller, supra note 244, at 296 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a)(2), (3)). Congress also 
altered the removal statute to expand the jurisdiction of the courts in these types of matters. See 
28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1) (2012); Miller, supra note 244, at 296.
371. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 4, 5 (2005)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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among the adverse parties and an amount in controversy in excess of $5 
million.372
Closer examination shows some key similarities between these 
various enactments, particularly the two most recent. For example, each 
of these statutes provides federal jurisdiction over matters primarily or 
exclusively governed by state law but addressing issues of national 
importance.373 This rationale appears to apply equally to commercial 
trusts, since they are also largely governed by state law despite their 
national, if not international, significance.374
Another similarity involves the nature of the relevant disputes. All 
three statutes address questions of particular complexity that can and 
often do arise on a multijurisdictional basis.375 Notably, commercial 
trusts also involve disputes involving complicated cross-border 
concerns.376
The final analogy to consider involves the number of parties and the 
types of claims asserted. Both the MMTJA and CAFA were designed to 
deal with large-scale disputes (i.e., class and mass actions) that cross 
jurisdictional lines.377 Not only can the number of plaintiffs be relatively 
large, but the disputes involve claims that are identical or substantially 
similar in nature. Allowing access to federal courts encourages resolution 
of the matter at a single time, in a single forum, and avoids inequitable 
and inefficient fragmentation of the litigation process. Notably, these 
elements are also present in disputes involving commercial trusts. Not 
only can internal trust disputes involve hundreds if not hundreds of 
thousands of parties spread across the nation, but most of the parties are 
similarly if not identically situated.378 Indeed, internal trust disputes often 
                                                                                                                     
372. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2012). CAFA also includes a provision allowing a “mass 
action” of over 100 plaintiffs to be removed to federal court if the $5 million minimum is also 
met. Id. § 1332(d)(11)(A)–(B)(i).
373. See Wood, supra note 17, at 604–05.
374. See supra note 297 and accompanying text. Notably, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) seeks to 
achieve a similar goal, although it does so through different means (i.e., by deeming corporations 
to be citizens of the state in which they are incorporated and the state which constitutes their 
principal place of business).
375. See 13E WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3605.
376. See supra notes 26, 72, 137, 155, 161 and accompanying text. It is also easy to see how 
disputes involving commercial trusts resemble those involving corporations, although 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(c)(1) addresses federal jurisdiction in a different manner. See supra note 374.
377. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), 1369, 1453 (2012).
378. See supra Subsection I.B.2 (noting that trusts can have thousands of geographically 
diverse participants). Notably, the size and character of commercial trust disputes resemble that 
of corporate disputes, suggesting that commercial trusts should be considered akin to corporations 
for jurisdictional purposes. See Barak Orbach & Grace Campbell Rebling, The Antitrust Curse of 
Bigness, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 607 (2012) (discussing concept of “bigness in business”).
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demonstrate more consistency in terms of the parties’ claims and defenses 
than actions under the MMTJA and CAFA.379
Together, these factors suggest that Congress should strongly consider 
adopting a statute that would allow commercial trust disputes to proceed 
in federal court if only minimal diversity exists. When drafting this 
statute, it may be necessary for Congress to include other requirements, 
similar to those used in the Interpleader Act, MMTJA, and CAFA, so as 
to make sure that the new regime is not overly inclusive. Thus, it might 
be reasonable to include a statutory minimum regarding either the number 
of parties or the amount in dispute, as is the case with both the MMTJA 
and CAFA.380 If this approach is adopted, Congress should also consider 
amending the federal removal statute to reflect the rationales contained 
in the new statute.381
B. Creation of a Statutory Definition of Citizenship Similar to 
That of Corporations
The second option available to Congress involves a statute putting 
commercial trusts on equal footing with corporations by deeming 
commercial trusts to be citizens of one or perhaps two easily identified 
jurisdictions.382 This proposal can be justified on the basis of the 
theoretical and functional similarity between commercial trusts and 
corporations,383 although additional support can be found in the types of 
rationales used to justify a statute allowing for minimal diversity.384
This proposal can also be rationalized by reference to the reasons for 
adopting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c).385 To fully appreciate the nature of the 
statute, it is necessary to go back to the mid-nineteenth century,386 when 
                                                                                                                     
379. Although parties to a dispute involving a commercial trust could be aligned on two 
separate sides (as would be the case in a dispute involving the propriety of a particular business 
decision), the litigation strategies would be essentially binary. See Strong, supra note 317, at 641. 
Indeed, internal trust disputes have often been described as proceeding in rem and thus would be 
more cohesive than some matters proceeding under the MMTJA or CAFA, which could require 
various subclasses to take into account different types of injuries or different applicable laws. See 
Strong, supra note 317, at 594, 637.
380. For example, the CAFA removal statute requires a minimum of 100 litigants, while the 
MMTJA requires seventy-five injured persons. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(11), 1369(a) (2012). 
CAFA also requires the amount in dispute to be in excess of $5 million. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
381. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012).
382. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
383. See supra Part II.
384. Thus, the fact that commercial trusts give rise to what are often large-scale disputes of 
national significance and particular complexity even though they are governed by state law could 
be used to extend the rule in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) to commercial trusts. See supra Part III.
385. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
386. An earlier decision held that corporations could be considered citizens, but looked 
through the corporate entity to individual shareholders to determine citizenship for purposes of 
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the Supreme Court first addressed the citizenship of corporations in 
Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston Railroad v. Letson387 and Marshall 
v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad.388 These decisions sought to preserve the 
“valuable privilege” of federal jurisdiction for corporations by creating a 
conclusive presumption that corporations were citizens of their state of 
incorporation.389 In both Marshall and Letson, the Court set aside the rule 
requiring courts to look through the corporation to the shareholders as the 
real parties in interest, thereby embracing the concept of “entity 
citizenship” as opposed to “aggregate citizenship.”390 This approach was 
justified because 
[t]he right of choosing an impartial tribunal is a privilege of 
no small practical importance, and more especially in cases 
where a distant plaintiff has to contend with the power and 
influence of great numbers and the combined wealth wielded 
by corporations in almost every State. It is of importance 
also to corporations themselves that they should enjoy the 
same privileges, in other States, where local prejudices or 
jealousy might injuriously affect them.391
One of the reasons why the Supreme Court adopted this rule was 
because “the members of a corporation are not individually liable for its 
obligations at all.”392 As a result, “there can be no judgment against them 
individually, nor against a part of them, the judgment must be against the 
body corporate, which includes all the members.”393
The pre-existing case law on commercial citizenship was explicitly 
incorporated into 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) when the statute was adopted in 
1958.394 Although some authorities have suggested the most important 
aspect of that process was the way in which it sought to limit federal 
jurisdiction through the insertion of language relating to a corporation’s 
principal place of business, Congress nevertheless reiterated the 
                                                                                                                     
diversity jurisdiction. See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 83 (1809),
overruled in part on other grounds by Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 
U.S. (2 How.) 497, 554–56 (1844), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
387. 43 U.S. at 558.
388. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328 (1854), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). 
389. Id. at 327–28.
390. Cohen, supra note 40, at 271–72.
391. Marshall, 57 U.S. at 329.
392. Letson, 43 U.S. at 503.
393. Id.
394. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2012).
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importance of diversity jurisdiction for commercial entities in its 
deliberations.395
Commercial trusts of course share numerous attributes with 
corporations, including the notion that “there can be no judgment against 
them individually, nor against a part of them.”396 As a result, it is logical 
for Congress to respond to Americold by adopting a definition for 
citizenship of commercial trusts similar to that used for corporations.397
Furthermore, there is nothing in either Letson398 or Marshall,399 or in 
the legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c),400 that suggests that either 
the Supreme Court or Congress believes that diversity jurisdiction was 
and is appropriate for incorporated entities but not for functionally 
identical entities such as commercial trusts. To the contrary, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that its current approach to unincorporated 
commercial entities, including commercial trusts, is entirely 
“unresponsive to policy considerations raised by the changing realities of 
business organization.”401
                                                                                                                     
395. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 97 (2010) (noting that “a major reason for the 
insertion of the ‘principal place of business’ language in the diversity statute” was to impede 
“jurisdictional manipulation”); S. REP. NO. 1830, at 4 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3099, 3101–02; Jack H. Friedenthal, New Limitations on Federal Jurisdiction, 11 STAN. L. REV.
213, 218–19 (1959). For example, the Senate report on the bill stated: 
The underlying purpose of diversity of citizenship legislation (which incidentally 
goes back to the beginning of the federal judicial system, having been established 
by the Judiciary Act of 1789) is to provide a separate forum for out-of-state 
citizens against the prejudices of local courts and local juries by making available 
to them the benefits and safeguards of the federal courts. Whatever the 
effectiveness of this rule, it was never intended to extend to local corporations 
which, because of a legal fiction, are considered citizens of another state. It is a 
matter of common knowledge that such incorporations are primarily initiated to 
obtain some advantage taxwise in the state of incorporation or to obtain the 
benefits of the more liberal provisions of the foreign state’s corporation laws. 
Such incorporations are not intended for the prime purpose of doing business in 
the foreign state. It appears neither fair nor proper for such a corporation to avoid 
trial in the state where it has its principal place of business by resorting to a legal 
device not available to the individual citizen. 
S. REP. NO. 1830, at 4.
396. Letson, 43 U.S. at 503. 
397. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); Americold Realty Trust v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 
1012, 1017 (2016); 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS L. HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 1:15 (3d ed. 2015).
398. See Letson, 43 U.S. at 497.
399. See Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 314 (1854), superseded by 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). 
400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c); S. REP. NO. 1830, at 4.
401. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 196 (1990).
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When considering the proposed change, it is also necessary to 
appreciate that the rule in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) cannot be justified on the 
grounds that the corporation is the standard form of business 
organization, since corporations do not in fact enjoy that status.402 As a 
result, there is no policy-related reason why the rule in Americold should 
prevail and indeed numerous reasons why it should not.
Should Congress decide to override Americold, it has several options. 
One possibility would look for inspiration from the Kintner tax
Regulations, which were originally generated to determine whether an 
unincorporated business association such as a commercial trust would be 
taxed as a corporation or what was known as a “pass-through” 
organization.403 Commentators seeking to build off these rules have 
suggested that 28 U.S.C. § 1332 should be amended to state:
(3) an entity other than a corporation that possesses at least 
four of the following characteristics: (i) limited liability for 
members; (ii) required filing of organizational documents by 
a state; (iii) lack of free transferability of interest; (iv) lack 
of centralized management; and (v) lack of continuity of life, 
shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State in which it has 
filed organizational documents and of the State where it has 
its principal place of business.404
This approach would create a workable rule for commercial trusts 
while also avoiding excessive litigation by allowing similar treatment of 
other sorts of unincorporated associations, including general 
partnerships, fraternal societies, or associations.405 However, the Kintner 
Regulations were unable to address the diversity and creativity associated 
with commercial trusts, which ultimately led to the Regulations’ 
demise.406 As a result, this proposal must be considered with some 
caution.
The better approach might be for Congress to focus on the language 
of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) itself, which states that:
a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State 
and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of 
the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of 
business, except that in any direct action against the insurer 
                                                                                                                     
402. See Thomas E. Rutledge, Recent Developments in Diversity Jurisdiction for LLCs and 
Other Unincorporated Forms, J. PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES, Nov.–Dec. 2015, at 57, 61.
403. See Christy, supra note 11, at 152; Oh, supra note 4, at 405–14.
404. Robert J. Tribeck, Cracking the Doctrinal Wall of Chapman v. Barney: A New Diversity 
Test for Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 89, 121 
(1995); see also Christy, supra note 11, at 152 (proposing this test in the context of commercial 
trusts).
405. See Tribeck, supra note 404, at 121–22.
406. See Oh, supra note 4, at 414.
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of a policy or contract of liability insurance, whether 
incorporated or unincorporated, to which action the insured 
is not joined as a party-defendant, such insurer shall be 
deemed a citizen of—
(A) every State and foreign state of which the insured is a 
citizen;
(B) every State and foreign state by which the insurer has 
been incorporated; and
(C) the State or foreign state where the insurer has its 
principal place of business.407
According to this model, Congress needs to consider three separate 
elements: the place where the commercial trust is formed, the trust’s 
principal place of business, and any special rules on insurance.408 Each 
element must of course be adapted to the needs of the commercial trust 
community.
The first item to consider is the place that is analogous to a 
corporation’s place of incorporation. Here, Congress has several options. 
First, Congress could codify the rule in Navarro so as to equate the 
citizenship of a commercial trust with the place(s) where the trustees 
reside.409 This approach has some merit, since trustees are an ineluctable 
part of every trust.410 However, some commentators have opposed this 
option on the grounds that not all business trusts require legal title to be 
vested in the trustees.411 Furthermore, commercial trusts can have an 
unlimited number of trustees, which could make this rule unwieldy and 
expand the number of jurisdictions in which a commercial trust is 
considered a citizen to more than two, which is the current limit under 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), at least in cases not involving insurance.412
A better alternative may be to indicate that commercial trusts are 
deemed to be citizens of the state in which they are formed. This approach 
                                                                                                                     
407. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012).
408. See id. The ABA has suggested similar amendments. See ABA Resolution 103B, supra 
note 41, at 15.
409. See Navarro Savings Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 465–66 (1980). 
410. See Mecklenburg Cty. v. Time Warner Entm’t—Advance/Newhouse P’ship, No. 
3:05cv333, 2010 WL 391279, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 26, 2010). While this rule could lead to some 
forum shopping (for example, by having all corporate trustees reside in a jurisdiction that was 
friendly to commercial trusts), that outcome seems preferable to eliminating the possibility of 
federal jurisdiction altogether, as Americold requires. See Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra 
Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1016–17 (2016); see also Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth 
of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 681–84 (2002) (discussing and 
criticizing conventional scholarship regarding forum shopping in the corporate context).
411. See Rutledge & Schaefer, supra note 12, at 107–09.
412. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
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would parallel the law of corporate citizenship and could easily be 
applied in cases such as Americold, which involved a REIT structured 
under a Maryland statute.413 This rule would also reflect the common 
perception that “commercial trusts and corporations can be thought of as 
mirror-image entities that respond to different investor needs.”414
This rule would be particularly easy to apply in cases where a 
commercial trust is created by statute. However, not all commercial trusts 
are statutory in nature.415 Instead, some commercial trusts are created by 
agreement pursuant to the same longstanding rules that govern non-
commercial trusts.416 In these cases, it may be difficult to establish the 
same type of connection to a particular state that exists in cases involving 
statutory business trusts. Therefore, Congress may wish to consider 
adding a proviso indicating that non-statutory commercial trusts are 
deemed to be citizens of the state whose law governs that trust. In most 
cases, the trust instrument should explicitly identify the applicable law.417
However, even if the settlor does not include a choice of law provision in 
the trust instrument, the relevant law can be determined through a 
standard conflict of laws analysis.418
The second element that Congress might include in a new statute on 
commercial trusts involves the trust’s principal place of business. 
Congress, courts, and commentators have noted the importance of dual 
citizenship to avoid “jurisdictional manipulation” by corporations,419
which suggests the need to establish a similar type of secondary 
citizenship for commercial trusts. There are several possible ways to deal 
with this element. First, Congress could duplicate the existing rule for 
corporations and indicate that a trust should be considered a citizen of the 
state where it maintains its principal place of business.420 This approach 
has the benefit of simplicity, since it tracks the current approach to 
corporate citizenship.421 Furthermore, most states require unincorporated 
                                                                                                                     
413. See id.; MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 8-101(c), 8-102 (West 2016); Americold,
136 S. Ct. at 1015. 
414. Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 561. 
415. See Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 32–33.
416. See KOVE ET AL., supra note 90, § 247. 
417. See Hague Convention on Trusts, supra note 81, art. 6; In re Peierls Family Inter Vivos 
Trs., 59 A.3d 471, 478–79 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
418. See Hague Convention on Trusts, supra note 81, art. 7; Wilson, supra note 284, at 890.
419. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 97 (2010) (noting that “a major reason for the 
insertion of the ‘principal place of business’ language in the diversity statute” was to impede 
“jurisdictional manipulation”); S. REP. NO. 1830, at 4 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3099, 3101–02; 13F WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3624; Caitlin Sawyer, Note, Don’t Dissolve 
the “Nerve Center”: A Status-Linked Citizenship Test for Principal Place of Business, 55 B.C. L.
REV. 641, 646–47 (2014).
420. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012).
421. See Oh, supra note 4, at 461, 471–73.
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business associations, including commercial trusts, to file some sort of 
statement regarding their business conduct within the state, which would 
assist with the task of identifying which state was the trust’s primary 
place of business.422 Thus, the transaction costs associated with this 
approach are relatively low.423
Adopting this approach would likely involve incorporation of the 
Supreme Court’s “nerve center” test, as enunciated in Hertz Corp. v. 
Friend.424 Although a number of commentators have praised the 
decision,425 other observers have noted that the nerve center test 
experiences certain problems as a result of “[t]he variety of corporate 
structures and activities” that currently exist in U.S. law and practice.426
Commercial trusts are equally or perhaps even more diverse in terms of 
their business structures and purposes, which may make it difficult to 
apply the nerve center test when seeking to determine these entities’ 
primary places of business.427 Additional problems may arise if a 
commercial trust operates primarily over the Internet rather than in a 
single physical location or if the trust has been dissolved.428 While 
corporations also must struggle with these issues, Congress should be 
aware of these types of concerns when reforming the law relating to the 
citizenship of commercial trusts.429
Alternatively, Congress might wish to track recent developments 
regarding the “at home” standard enunciated by federal courts in the 
context of personal jurisdiction.430 This possibility reflects certain 
                                                                                                                     
422. See id. at 469. Foreign trusts must file similar paperwork to obtain certain benefits. See 
UNIFORM STATUTORY TRUST ENTITY ACT §§ 102, 901–02, 905 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2009); cf. id. 
§ 301 (noting parallels between domestic and qualified foreign trusts).
423. See Oh, supra note 4, at 471–73.
424. See Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 89–91.
425. See Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1, 10–11 
(2011) (expressing some skepticism); The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Leading Cases: Federal 
Jurisdiction and Procedure, 124 HARV. L. REV. 309, 315 (2010) [hereinafter Leading Cases].
426. Sawyer, supra note 419, at 652; see also Leading Cases, supra note 425, at 319 (noting 
difficulties in judicial administration). 
427. See supra Subsection I.B.2.
428. See Sawyer, supra note 419, at 652–53 (discussing problems of dissolved and inactive 
corporations). Although trust law disapproves of passive trusts, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS § 6(3) cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2001), the definition of a commercial trust “does not require 
that the business be of an active or extensive nature.” KOVE ET AL., supra note 90, § 247. Indeed, 
commercial trusts are often seen as “static entities with passive managers” as compared to the 
aggressive and opportunistic approach employed by corporate managers. Schwarcz, supra note 
26, at 328. 
429. See Chaplin, supra note 40, at 98–99; Sawyer, supra note 419, at 652–53. 
430. See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2115 (2016); Daimler AG 
v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 
U.S. 915, 919, 924 (2011); Niesel, supra note 2, at 837 (noting that recent case law from the 
Supreme Court requires courts to consider three separate factors in matters involving corporate 
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language in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown431 that 
characterizes the place of incorporation and principal place of business 
of a corporation as “paradigm” forums where general personal 
jurisdiction exists.432 Commentators discussing general jurisdiction have 
questioned whether this reference should be taken to reflect a link 
between the statutory requirements for diversity jurisdiction and the 
common law requirements for personal jurisdiction,433 and it may be 
useful to consider whether the reverse is true (i.e., whether the law 
regarding personal jurisdiction should influence the law of diversity 
jurisdiction). In some ways, increasing the links between subject matter 
and personal jurisdiction could be seen as beneficial, since it might 
increase jurisdictional clarity.434 However, commentators have identified 
several problems arising out of the nebulous nature of the “at home” 
requirement, which suggests that Congress might do well to avoid this 
standard when creating a new statute regarding the citizenship of 
commercial trusts.435
The third and final issue that Congress must consider is whether to 
incorporate a special rule regarding commercial trusts involved in the 
insurance business. Trusts are relatively common in the insurance 
industry, either as a means of complying with various U.S. regulations 
regarding foreign insurers436 or as a means of spreading the risk of loss 
amongst various underwriters.437 The situation regarding insurance-
                                                                                                                     
entities: the state of incorporation, the location of the principal place of business, and any unique
factors that can be used to demonstrate where the corporation is essentially “at home”). The 
Supreme Court has also recently addressed specific jurisdiction, though to less criticism. See 
Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014); Parry, supra note 2, at 619–23.
431. 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
432. See id. at 924 (describing general jurisdiction for a corporation as the place “in which 
the corporation is fairly regarded as at home” and citing Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at 
General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 728 (1988), as describing domicile, place of 
incorporation, and principal place of business as “paradig[m]” bases for general jurisdiction); 
Niesel, supra note 2, at 859.
433. See Niesel, supra note 2, at 859–60 (citing authorities).
434. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010) (noting that “[s]imple jurisdictional 
rules . . . promote greater predictability”); Dodson, supra note 425, at 4–5, 23–24 (identifying 
difficulties in achieving jurisdictional clarity).
435. See Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 2, at 105–07 (suggesting that although Daimler 
may result in “a level of certainty and predictability for which some commentators have longed,” 
it has done so at a cost); Niesel, supra note 2, at 870–74. But see id. at 874 (discussing how to 
simplify the “at home” analysis). 
436. See Langbein, supra note 8, at 176.
437. See Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 796 F. Supp. 103, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“Upon 
acceptance into the Society of Lloyd’s, the individual executes a number of documents, among 
which are the premium trust deed, a member’s agent agreement, and a managing agent 
agreement.”); Ian Kelley, Note, Regulatory Crisis at Lloyd’s of London: Reform from Within, 18 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1924, 1932 (1995).
66
Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 4 [2017], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss4/1
2017] CONGRESS AND COMMERCIAL TRUSTS 1087
related trusts is complicated by the fact that U.S. courts are split on the 
legal status of Lloyd’s, the largest insurance market in the world,438
including questions on how Lloyd’s is to be treated for diversity 
purposes.439 Although a full analysis of Lloyd’s is beyond the scope of 
the current Article, a significant amount of the business conducted by 
Lloyd’s involves trusts.440
As complicated as insurance-related disputes may be, many of the 
problems arise from the exclusion of commercial trusts and similarly 
unincorporated entities from 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). Creating a new 
statutory rule to address commercial trusts should eliminate a number of 
these concerns, particularly if the statute is drafted in such a manner as to 
deal with the Lloyd’s problem.
In terms of language, the best solution would likely be to simply adopt 
the insurance-related terminology used in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).441 Not 
only is this solution simple as a matter of legislative drafting, it also does 
not jeopardize the possibility of diversity jurisdiction, since the addition 
of the citizenship of the insured party to the calculus means that there are 
only a limited number of states that need to be added to the jurisdictional 
calculus. This is a much better outcome than that which currently applies 
in most cases involving Lloyd’s, where the citizenship of all of the 
underwriters (which can run in the tens of thousands) must be 
considered.442
                                                                                                                     
438. What Is Lloyd’s, LLOYDS, https://www.lloyds.com/lloyds (last visited June 30, 2017)
(describing the function of Lloyd’s); see Terri K. Benton, Where Do I Fit in? Citizenship Claims 
and the § 1332 Diversity Statute in Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Osting-Schwinn, 79 DEF. COUNS.
J. 67, 69 (2012); Strong, supra note 161, at 305.
439. Three circuits require complete diversity of all underwriters. See Underwriters at 
Lloyd’s v. Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d 1079, 1084, 1088–89 (11th Cir. 2010) (requiring Lloyd’s 
to plead the citizenship of all of its underwriters, which included over 400 syndicates and 30,000 
members, when establishing diversity jurisdiction); E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident & Cas. 
Ins., 160 F.3d 925, 931 (2d Cir. 1998); Ind. Gas Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 314, 317 (7th Cir. 
1998). One circuit does not. See Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Layne, 26 F.3d 39, 
42–44 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying the “real party to the controversy” test). Other courts have also 
weighed in on the subject. See Howard M. Tollin & Mark Deckman, Lloyd’s of London and the 
Problem with Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 289, 293–99 (2000).
440. See Lloyd’s Trust Deeds, LLOYD’S, https://www.lloyds.com/the-market/operating-at-
lloyds/regulation/lloyds-trust-deeds (last visited June 30, 2017) (including various Lloyd’s trust 
deeds, including several U.S. trust deeds, such as the Lloyd’s American Trust Fund (LATF), held 
in New York and involving premiums and other receipts relating to general business denominated 
in U.S. dollars, as well as various trust deeds involving business in Kentucky and Illinois and in 
other countries).
441. See id.
442. See Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d at 1084 (involving underwriters that included over 400 
syndicates and 30,000 members).
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CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Americold Realty Trust 
v. ConAgra Foods, Inc. is in many ways consistent with existing 
jurisprudence, the opinion will create significant problems if it is allowed 
to stand.443 Not only will the decision severely restrict parties’ ability to 
have commercial trust disputes heard in federal courts, it will also cause 
a potentially significant number of commercial actors to either exit the 
U.S. judicial system through the use of an arbitration agreement, choice 
of court clause, or choice of law provision, or through a decision to 
organize as a commercial trust in a foreign jurisdiction. Americold will 
also act as a “nudge” in favor of the corporate form, which could lead to 
significant but as of yet unknown ramifications.444
Over the years, the Supreme Court has had several opportunities to 
consider the citizenship of unincorporated business associations and has 
declined to treat those entities as analogous to corporations, claiming that 
such measures fall within the province of the legislature.445 None of those 
previous cases inspired a congressional override, despite the near-
universal support of both the academic and practitioner communities for 
reform in this field.446 However, this Article has shown that legislative 
action is now necessary, given both the nature and the quantum of 
problems created by Americold.
Unlike some of the other types of unincorporated business 
associations that the Supreme Court has considered in the past, 
commercial trusts are a ubiquitous part of the American legal landscape, 
reaching across numerous industries that routinely operate on an 
interstate or international basis.447 Commercial trusts are regularly used 
in fields laden with public policy concerns and control trillions of dollars’ 
worth of assets, thereby affecting the economic and social interests of 
both individuals and institutions.448 Requiring these types of disputes to 
                                                                                                                     
443. 136 S. Ct. 1012 (2016).
444. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 355, at 8.
445. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1017; Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 306 
(2006) (determining the citizenship of a federally chartered national bank for diversity purposes); 
Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 568–69 (2004) (considering whether a 
post-filing change in citizenship and status of both limited and general partners’ citizenship should 
be considered in determining a partnership’s citizenship in a diversity case); Carden v. Arkoma 
Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195–96 (1990) (reaffirming the rule that the citizenship of all members of 
a partnership must be considered in determining whether complete diversity exists).
446. See ABA Resolution 103B, supra note 41, at 15 (suggesting all unincorporated entities 
be treated the same way as corporations for purposes of diversity jurisdiction); Chaplin, supra 
note 40, at 98–99; Cohen, supra note 40, at 275; Kleinberger, supra note 40, at 829; Matheson & 
Olson, supra note 40, at 3. 
447. See supra Subsection I.B.2.
448. See supra Subsection I.B.2.
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be heard in state rather than federal court would not only be ill-advised 
as a practical matter, it would make little sense in theoretical terms, given 
that commercial trusts have long been recognized as “mirror image” 
equivalents of corporations, a type of business association that has been 
given special jurisdictional status by both Congress and the Court for over 
150 years.449
The effects of Americold have already been felt and will only increase 
in the coming months and years.450 However, the Court does not have the 
final word on this issue. Instead, as the Justices themselves recognized, 
Congress is empowered to craft a statutory solution to cure the problems
created by this decision.451
Two possibilities have been explored here. First, Congress could enact 
legislation allowing commercial trusts to be heard in federal court 
pursuant to minimal rather than complete diversity, as is the case under 
the Interpleader Act, the MMTJA, and CAFA.452 Second, Congress could 
adopt a statute, similar to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), identifying a discrete 
number of jurisdictions where a commercial trust can be considered a 
citizen.453 Both of these alternatives are feasible. However, the latter 
option appears superior for several reasons.
Under the minimal diversity approach, plaintiffs will have more 
control in choosing the venue. This technique appears appropriate in 
cases involving mass disasters and class actions, because those situations
involve large numbers of injured individuals, many of them blameless,
unsophisticated, or both, who deserve some degree of autonomy in 
choosing the place of litigation, either for the sake of convenience or 
equity. It is therefore appropriate for the underlying legislation (i.e., the 
MMTJA and CAFA) to create a rule that provides for a federal forum but 
that does not mandate a particular place where the dispute should be 
heard.454
Although the types of disputes that arise in cases involving minimal 
diversity may be procedurally complex, many of them will be governed 
by tort or contract law. While judges are occasionally faced with difficult 
conflict of laws concerns, problems arise less often in practice than in 
                                                                                                                     
449. See Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 550 (1928) (noting functional equivalence of the
two business forms); Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328 (1854), 
superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012); Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. 
v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
450. See RTP LLC v. ORIX Real Estate Capital, Inc., 827 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(involving a pension trust); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Transcont’l Realty Inv’rs, Inc., No. 3:14-
cv-3565-BN, 2016 WL 3570648, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 1, 2016) (involving a securitization trust).
451. See Americold Realty Trust v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1017 (2016).
452. See supra notes 364–81 and accompanying text.
453. See supra Section IV.B.
454. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), 1369, 1453.
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theory.455 Furthermore, the basic principles of tort and contract law are 
relatively similar across the country, despite variation in certain details.456
As a result, an incorrect determination of the conflict of laws analyses 
will likely not affect the outcome of the dispute and therefore will not
offend the public policy of the state whose law ought to have been 
applied.
Litigation involving commercial trusts reflects a number of qualities 
that are in many ways analogous to litigation involving corporations. For 
example, corporations and commercial trusts both have a high need for 
predictability, and a statutory model that establishes the citizenship of a 
commercial trust will increase predictability in a number of ways. For 
instance, adopting a commercial trust statute that is modeled on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(c) would likely eliminate the distinction between Rules 17(b)(2) 
and 17(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the law 
applicable to the question of whether a particular business organization 
has the ability to sue in its own name and therefore rationalize the venue 
selection analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.457 Increased predictability in 
terms of the location of suit will also help overcome concerns about the 
proper and consistent application of substantive law, both in terms of the
anticipated outcome of the dispute as well as respect for the public policy 
of the state whose law governs the matter in question. 
This issue is particularly important given that the vast majority of 
litigation involving commercial trusts involves internal disputes 
regarding the operation and governance of the trust.458 Not only do these 
types of suits involve complex questions of law, they also involve matters 
that are intimately connected with public policy. As a result, it is in the 
interest of the trust, the parties (including the shareholder-beneficiaries), 
the state(s), and the nation to have these issues resolved in a consistent 
and predictable manner. All of these rationales are similar to those 
involving corporate litigation. As a result, it seems better to adopt a rule 
that puts commercial trust litigation on par with corporate litigation 
through the definition of citizenship rather than a rule that simply 
provides commercial trust disputes with increased access to federal courts 
                                                                                                                     
455. See Joseph William Singer, Multistate Justice: Better Law, Comity, and Fairness in the 
Conflict of Laws, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1923, 1924–25. 
456. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal Common Law, 101 VA. L.
REV. 1, 36 (2015); Jane Stapleton, Benefits of Comparative Tort Reasoning: Lost in Translation,
1 J. TORT L. 6, 38–40 (2007). 
457. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) (2012) (stating “an entity with the capacity to sue and be 
sued in its common name under applicable law, whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to 
reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s 
personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question”); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c); FED. R.
CIV. P. 17(b); supra notes 113–16 and accompanying text (regarding Rule 17).
458. See Hwang, supra note 87, at 83.
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by allowing such suits to rely on minimal rather than complete diversity. 
Indeed, in 2015, the American Bar Association adopted a resolution 
supporting just such an approach.459
As Judge Diane Wood has recognized, Congress has acted in the past 
to bring “the federal courts back into the business of adjudicating matters 
of national importance where no federal law prescribes the rule of 
decision.”460 While Congress must be cautious,461 jurisdictional reform 
regarding commercial trusts can and should be completed without 
unnecessary delay so as to protect U.S. institutions and individuals, as 
well as the U.S. economy, from significant and potentially long-lasting 
harm. Indeed, as Chief Justice (formerly President) William Howard Taft 
once said: 
No single element—and I want to emphasize this . . . —no
single element in our governmental system has done so 
much to secure capital for the legitimate development of 
enterprises . . . as the existence of federal courts . . . with a 
jurisdiction to hear diverse citizenship cases.462
As the preceding discussion has demonstrated, interstate and 
international disputes involving commercial trusts should be heard in 
federal district court as a matter of both policy and prudence. Congress 
should therefore take the appropriate steps to override the Supreme Court 
decision in Americold Realty Trust v. ConAgra Foods, Ltd. and allow 
parties to rely on diversity jurisdiction in cases involving commercial 
trusts.
                                                                                                                     
459. See ABA Resolution 103B, supra note 41, at 6, 15 (suggesting all unincorporated 
entities be treated the same way as corporations for purposes of diversity jurisdiction).
460. Wood, supra note 17, at 604; see also Miller, supra note 244, at 271; James M. 
Underwood, The Late, Great Diversity Jurisdiction, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 222 (2006) 
(“Congress has . . . embarked on a very different path, apparently intent upon pulling diversity 
out of the academic and judicial doghouse and more fully exercising its Article III power to open 
the doors to the federal courts. Such conduct is constitutional and likely to lead to dramatic 
changes in the way important interstate disputes are resolved. It is time for the legal community 
to wake up to these changes.”).
461. Designing a clear jurisdictional approach is deceptively difficult. See Dodson, supra 
note 425, at 23–24.
462. Taft, supra note 4, at 604. 
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